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Judicial Construction of Section 526 and the
Importation of Grey Market Goods: From Total
Exclusion to Unimpeded Entry
Steven P. Kersner*and Donald S. Stein**

I.

Introduction
The question of permitting the sale of grey market goods' in the

United States has been the subject of considerable controversy and

debate over the past few years. Imports of grey market goods have
increased dramatically and become the subject of substantial litiga-

tion. The size of the grey market speaks for itself. Sales of such merchandise over the past few years are estimated at $5.5-10 billion
2
annually.
The grey market consists of both trademarked and copyrighted
merchandise. Importation of grey market copyrighted goods is regulated by section 602 of the Copyright Act of 1976.3 Copyrighted
grey market goods present little controversy. Although the Copyright Act of 1976 specifically allows the importation of grey market
goods, 4 it explicitly states that such importation constitutes a copy-

right infringement. 5 Importation of grey market trademarked goods is
regulated by section 526(a) of the Tariff Act of 19306 and, arguably,
by section 42 of the Lanham Trademark Act of 1946. 7 Most of the
grey market controversy centers on the administrative construction
given these statutes by the U.S. Customs Service, the agency charged
* Steven P. Kersner is a member of the law firm of Brownstein, Zeidman and
Schomer, and a graduate of the Hofstra University School of Law (J.D., 1976).
** Donald S. Stein is an associate in the law firm of Brownstein, Zeidman and
Schomer, and a graduate of the American University's Washington College of Law (J.D.,
1981).
1 Grey market goods are goods authorized by the U.S. trademark (or copyright)
owner to be manufactured and marketed overseas, but rather than sold abroad, these
goods are imported into the United States and sold by third parties without the authorization of the trademark (or copyright) holder.
2 See generally Goodgame, Inside the Grey Market, TIME, Oct. 28, 1985, at 76; The $7
Billion Gray Market: Where It Stops, Nobody Knows, Bus. WK., April 15, 1985, at 86; Riley, Gray
Market Fight Isn't Black and White, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 28, 1985, at 1, col. 3.
3 Copyright Act of 1976, § 602, 17 U.S.C. § 602 (1982).
4 Id. § 602(b).
5 Id. § 602(a).
6 Tariff Act of 1930, § 526(a), 19 U.S.C. § 1526(a) (1982).
7 Lanham Trademark Act of 1946, § 42, 15 U.S.C. § 1124 (1982). See infra note 8.
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with their enforcement. This article focuses solely on grey market
trademarked goods and the judicial construction given to section
526(a) of the Tariff Act of 1930-the statute enacted to prohibit their
8
importation.
II.

Section 526(a) of the Tariff Act of 1930
A.

The Current Controversy: The Statute and the Regulations

The importation and sale of grey market trademarked goods is
regulated principally by section 526(a) of the Tariff Act of 1930. 9
This provision prohibits importation into the United States of
(1) "any merchandise of foreign manufacture" which (2) "bears a
trademark owned by a citizen of, or by a corporation . . . organized
within the United States" unless (3) the "written consent" of the U.S.
trademark owner to such importation is obtained, (4) when said
trademark has been properly registered with the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office and recorded with the U.S. Customs Service.' 0
The administration and enforcement of this provision has been delegated to the U.S. Customs Service (a part of the Treasury Department), which has promulgated regulations for the administration and
enforcement of the statute. These provisions, set forth in section
8 At this point, the authors would like to note that they are counsel to numerous U.S.
trademark and copyright owners, including Vivitar Corporation in its recent grey market
litigation (Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 593 F. Supp. 420 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984), aff'd, 761
F.2d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 791 (1986)), and Original Appalachian
Artworks, Inc. and Coleco Industries, Inc. in their pending grey market-based litigation
before the U.S. International Trade Commission under section 337 of the Tariff Act of
1930, as amended ("Certain Soft Sculpture Dolls, Popularly Known as 'CABBAGE
PATCH KIDS', Related Literature and Packaging Therefor" (Investigation No. 337-TA231)). As counsel to U.S. trademark owners, the authors have a distinct view concerning
the propriety of grey market imports. Although opposing views are presented by the authors, the reader should be cognizant of the fact that the authors clearly identify with the
position of U.S. intellectual property owners concerning this matter.
9 19 U.S.C. § 1526(a) (1982). Arguably, § 42 of the Lanham Trademark Act of 1946
(15 U.S.C. § 1124 (1982)) also regulates the importation and sale of such goods, but the
reference in this provision to merchandise which shall "copy or simulate" a properly registered copyright has caused this provision to be read as prohibiting only the importation of
counterfeit (i.e., owner) goods. See, e.g., Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of Am. Trademarks v. United States, 598 F. Supp. 844, 848 (D.D.C. 1984), rev d, 790 F.2d 903 (D.C. Cir.
1986); Memorandum and Order at 20-26, Olympus Corp. v. United States, 627 F. Supp.
911 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), aft'd, 792 F.2d 315 (2d Cir. 1986).
to 19 U.S.C. § 1526(a) (1982). Section 526 of the Tariff Act of 1930 was originally
enacted as part of the Tariff Act of 1922, ch. 356, § 526, 42 Stat. 858, 975 (1922), and was
reenacted without change in 1930. Section 526 further provides that merchandise imported into the United States in violation of § 526(a) "shall be subject to seizure and forfeiture" by the U.S. Customs Service, 19 U.S.C. § 1526(b) (1982). Furthermore, persons
dealing in merchandise prescribed by the statute may be enjoined from dealing in such
goods, and may also be required to export or destroy such merchandise or to remove or
obliterate the trademark. Id. § 1526(c). Section 526(c) also provides that a trademark
owner may seek damages and profits, as provided for in the Lanham Act. Id. The statute
also contains a personal use exception to its prohibitions, Id. § 1526(d), as well as provisions relating to the importation of merchandise bearing counterfeit trademarks. Id.
§ 1526(e).
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133.21 (c) of the Customs Service regulations,I have been the major
source of the grey market controversy.
Since the enactment of section 526(a) of the Tariff Act of 1922,
the Treasury Department has established customs regulations
designed for its administration and enforcement. Although the first
regulations neither placed limitations upon, nor contained exceptions to, the protection afforded by that statute,' 2 since 1936,1 3 the
Treasury Department and Customs Service have read certain exceptions into the scope of protection afforded by it. These exceptions,
set forth in sections 133.21(c)(1), (2), and (3) of the current Customs
Service regulations,' 4 deny protection to foreign imports bearing a
U.S. owned trademark when both the foreign and U.S. trademark are
owned by the same person or business entity, 15 when those owners
are parent and subsidiary companies or otherwise subject to common ownership or control,' 6 and when the articles of foreign manuapplied under authorization of
facture bear a recorded trademark
7
the U.S. trademark owner.'
Pursuant to these regulations, the Customs Service permits the
entry of certain grey market merchandise into the United States.
Nothing in the plain language of section 526, however, indicates a
congressional intent to except any grey market imports from that
provision's protection. 1 8 Exceptions to the protection afforded to
U.S. trademark owners, however, may be consistent with the language of section 42 of the Lanham Act which speaks of goods which
"copy or simulate" a registered trademark. Arguably, the phrase
"copy or simulate" refers only to counterfeit goods, not grey market

11

19 C.F.R. § 133.21(c)(1) (1986).
12 T.D. 29,673, 43 Treas. Dec. 515 (1923).
13 T.D. 48,537, 70 Treas. Dec. 336 (1936). These regulations'were promulgated pursuant to, and to enforce, both § 526 of the Tariff Act of 1930 and § 27 of the Trademark
Act of 1905 (predecessor provision of § 42 of the Lanham Act). Id. at 336-37.
14 19 C.F.R. § 133.21(c)(1)-(3) (1986).
15 Id. § 133.21(c)(1).

16 Id. § 133.21(c)(2).
'7 Id. § 133.21(c)(3).
18 See COPIAT, 790 F.2d at 907-08, where the court of appeals stated that § 526 "does
not on its face, admit any exceptions based upon the relationship of the American and
foreign trademark owners or upon whether the American owner has authorized the use of
the trademark abroad." See also Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 593 F. Supp. 420 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1984), aff'd, 761 F.2d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 791 (1986). At
the trial level, the Court of International Trade in Vivitar found that both "[d]efendant and
intervenor concede that the literal language of § 526 supports plaintiff's construction [of
the statute]," i.e., that there is no limitation on the scope of protection afforded by the
language of the section. 593 F. Supp. at 425. The court of appeals also noted that the
language of § 526(a) "appear[s] to create a sweeping bar to importations of any goods
bearing the same trademark as that owned by the U.S. company without the latter's consent." 761 F.2d at 1560-61. See also Memorandum and Order at 29, Olympus, 627 F. Supp.
at 911 ("Section 526, read literally, would indeed give plaintiff the right to exclude all
goods bearing the Olympus trademark.").
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goods. 19 This position was adopted by the district court in Coalition
to Preserve the Integrity of American Trademarks v.
(COPIAT).20

United States

The Customs Service sets forth three principal arguments tojustify limiting the protection afforded U.S. trademark owners. 2 1 First,
the Customs Service contends that the legislative history of section
526 demonstrates that Congress intended to limit the protection af22
forded U.S. trademark owners, despite the statute's plain language.
Second, the Customs Service contends that its regulations reflect a
longstanding administrative practice of almost 50 years deserving
great deference. Finally, the Customs Service contends that Congress ratified its construction of section 526(a) in 1978 when it
23
amended the section by adding new subsections (d) and (e).
Customs' construction and administration of section 526(a) has
come under frequent attack. Some U.S. trademark owners view exceptions to the apparent blanket protection of section 526(a) as contrary to the intent of Congress. Regarding the language of section
526(a) as clear and unambiguous, U.S. trademark owners argue that

nothing indicates that Congress intended any exceptions to the statutory protection. Further, in response to Customs Service justifications for its regulations, U.S. trademark owners argue that the

legislative history of section 526 does not evidence an intent contrary to the plain language used in the statute and that the Customs
Service's administration and enforcement of the section has been
neither consistent nor longstanding.

Furthermore, they point out

that Congress has never ratified the present Customs Service administration and enforcement of the section.
The most important of these arguments concerns whether Con19 See, e.g., Memorandum for 47th Street Photo, Inc. in Support of Motion to dismiss
at 14-26, COPIAT, 598 F. Supp. at 844; Defendants' Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Plaintiff's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment and in Support of
Defendants' Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment at 6-7, 12-15, Olympus, 627 F. Supp. at
911.
20 598 F. Supp. at 848. Other courts have split over this matter. See generally Memorandum and Order at 20-26, Olympus, 627 F. Supp. at 911.
21 See Olympus, 627 F. Supp. at 911; COPIAT, 598 F. Supp. at 844; Vivitar Corp. v.
United States, 593 F. Supp. 420 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984), aff'd, 761 F.2d 1552 (Fed. Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 791 (1986).
22 A decision by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in A. Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel,
275 F. 539 (2d Cir. 1921), rev'd, 260 U.S. 689 (1923), was the catalyst prompting the enactment of § 526. In that case, the court of appeals held that a U.S. trademark owner could
not enjoin as an infringement the sale of goods bearing a genuine foreign trademark. In
Katzel, the foreign manufacturer was not licensed by or otherwise related to the U.S. trademark owner. This decision was eventually reversed by the Supreme Court. The Customs
Service has argued that the protection afforded by § 526(a) was intended by Congress to
address solely the Katzel fact situation, i.e., when the foreign manufacturer is not licensed
by or otherwise related to the U.S. trademark owners.
23 19 U.S.C. § 1526(d)-(e) (1982). These subsections were added by the Customs
Procedural Reform and Simplification Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-410, 92 Stat. 888, 903
(1978).
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gress intended to limit the protection of section 526 to the facts of
the case that led to its enactment, A. Bourois & Co. v. Katzel,2 4 or
rather meant to provide the broader protection seemingly dictated
by the plain language of the statute. Since the intent of Congress in
its enactment of the section has been the focus of much of the grey
market controversy, a brief review of both Katzel and the congressional reaction is necessary to understand fully subsequent judicial
decisions construing the statute. The evolution of Customs Service
regulations promulgated pursuant to section 526 is also traced to
provide a frame of reference against which current regulations may
be judged. With this background, the judicial decisions delineating
the scope of protection afforded U.S. trademark owners under section 526(a) can be better analyzed.
B.

Katzel and the Enactment of Section 526

Most agree that section 526 was at least in part Congress' response to the perceived unfairness of the decision of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in A. Bourjois & Co. v.
Katzel.25 Had the Supreme Court's reversal of that decision come
prior to the enactment of the Tariff Act of 1922, section 526 might
26
never have been enacted.
In Katzel a U.S. distributor purchased the domestic distribution
rights, including the U.S. trademark, to a face powder manufactured
in France. The transaction permitted the French manufacturer to
continue production of the powder, to supply it to the U.S. distributor, and to sell the powder in France under a mark identical to that
used by a domestic firm. A third party discovered, however, that it
could purchase the face powder in France, import it into the United
States in the original wrapper with the French firm's trademark, and
undersell the U.S. distributor. Thus, the importer diverted to itself
the value of the U.S. distributor's trademark. The Second Circuit
held that U.S. trademark law provided no remedy to the U.S. distributor because the genuine French mark accurately indicated the origin of the powder and could not be said to "copy or simulate" the
identical U.S. trademark.
The Katzel decision was premised on the prevailing but now discredited "universality" principle of trademarks which underlies a series of Second Circuit decisions. Under the principle, U.S.
trademark owners holding contracts for the exclusive right to import
foreign trademarked goods were powerless to prevent third parties
from importing and selling goods with genuine foreign trademarks
24 275 F. at 539.
25 Id.
26 See Vivitar, 593 F. Supp. at 426.
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in the United States. 2 7 Katzel merely reflected past applications of
the "universality" principle.
The inherent unfairness of this decision was quickly recognized,
and both Congress and the Supreme Court sought to remedy the
injustice. Congress' response was to enact section 526 of the Tariff
Act of 1922. The Supreme Court, following passage of this Act, reversed the Second Circuit's decision in Katzel. In an opinion written
by Justice Holmes,2 8 the Court explained that the true significance of
a trademark was not its indication of the origin or manufacture of the
merchandise, but its signification of the local business goodwill of
the domestic trademark owner. 29 Thus, the Supreme Court held
that the imported French powder infringed the U.S. trademark
30
owner's exclusive right to that mark.
Holmes' opinion in Katzel replaced the Second Circuit's universality doctrine with the "territoriality" principle. This approach recognizes that a trademark has a separate legal existence under each
country's laws. The proper lawful function of a trademark is not primarily specification of the origin of a good, but rather a symbolization of the domestic goodwill of the trademark owner. Under the
territoriality principle, the consuming public may rely on the domestic reputation of a trademarked good. Correspondingly, the trademark owner is assured that the goodwill and reputation of the
marked good will not be diminished by unauthorized use of the
31
trademark in domestic commerce.
Prior to the Supreme Court decision in Katzel, Congress undertook to remedy the situation created by the court of appeals decision
through additions to the then pending Tariff Act of 1922. Although
the legislative history of section 526 is "sparse,"13 2 consisting of only
a short floor debate3 3 and a brief paragraph in a Conference Re27 See Fred Gretsche Mfg. Co. v. Schoening, 238 F. 780 (2d Cir. 1916); Appollinaris
Co. v. Scherer, 27 F. 18 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1886). See generally Osawa & Co. v. B & H Photo,
589 F. Supp. 1163 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
28 260 U.S. at 689.
29 Id. at 692.
30 Id. at 691. During the same term, an almost identical factual situation was
presented to the Supreme Court for resolution, with the question of whether § 27 of the
Trademark Act of 1905 (predecessor provision to § 42 of the Lanham Trademark Act),
which excluded from entry into the United States merchandise bearing trademarks which
"copy or simulate" registered U.S. trademarks, prohibited such importations. The
Supreme Court, in A. Bourjois v. Aldridge, 263 U.S. 675 (1923) (per curiam), relying on
its prior decision in Katzel, held that the merchandise at issue, although genuine, constituted an infringement and was to be excluded from entry into the United States under
§ 27 of the Trademark Act of 1905. Id. at 676. It should be noted that the present Customs Service regulations provide for the exclusion of grey market trademarked goods
when the U.S. trademark owner has purchased the U.S. rights to the trademark from an
unrelated foreign company, i.e., the Katzel fact situation.
31 See Osawa, 589 F. Supp. at 1171-72, and cases cited therein.
32 Vivitar, 593 F. Supp. at 427.
33 62 CONG. REC. 11,602-05 (1922).
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port, 34 it was not a hastily drawn up provision. The origin of the
language of section 526 is part of a paragraph in an American Bar
Association report which had given "careful consideration" to all its
possible ramifications. 35 The proposed provision, however, was introduced as a floor amendment to the Tariff Act of 1922 under a rule
which limited debate to ten minutes. 36 The Conference Report
states:
A recent decision of the circuit court of appeals holds that existing
law does not prevent the importation of merchandise bearing the
same trade-mark as merchandise of the United States, if the imported merchandise is genuine and there is no fraud upon the public. The Senate amendment makes such importation unlawful
37
without the consent of the owner of the American trade-mark.

There is no language in the Conference Report indicating that
Congress enacted section 526 solely to remedy the court of appeals
decision in Katzel or that its protection of U.S. trademark owners was
to be limited to trademark owners who purchased rights in trademarks from unrelated foreign companies. Indeed, the Conference
Report actually describes the provision in very broad terms seemingly excluding the importation of genuine trademarked merchandise into the United States without consent of the U.S. trademark
owner. There was not the slightest suggestion that the narrow facts
of Katzel were critical to the bill's content. In fact, Katzel was neither
specifically identified nor factually discussed in the Report. The
more reasonable inference from the Report is that its authors intended the language of the bill to speak for itself and not be limited
38
to either the Katzel facts or any other situation.
34 H.R. REP. No. 1223, 67th Cong., 2d Sess. 158 (19'22).
35 62 CONG. REC. 11,603 (1922).
36 62 CONG. REC. 11,602-05 (1922). The history of this amendment was described by
Senator Moses in the following manner:
Mr. President, the history of this amendment is interesting. It was written by
a lawyer well known in the precincts of the Capitol; it was inserted in the bill
originally, without hearing, upon the votes of four Senators; it was removed
from the bill by a disagreeing vote on the 6th of June, upon an understanding, as I believed, that if it were to be taken up again it should be taken up as
a separate measure on its own merits and before the Committee on Patents,
which properly has jurisdiction of the subject matter. It was put back in the
bill among the myriad amendments brought in by the committee the other
morning after their midnight session, and it may be fairly classified now as
one of the midnight amendments, like the "midnight judges" of the John
Adams administration.
Id. at 11,602.
37 H.R. REP. No. 1223, supra note 34, at 158. This provision was discussed only in
the Conference Report as a result of it being introduced at such a late stage in the legislative process.
38 In fact, this point was conceded by the Customs Service in a 1983 amicus curiae
brief it filed jointly with the Department ofJustice in Bell & Howell: Mamiya Co. v. Masel
Supply Co., 719 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1983). Discussing the scope to be afforded to § 526, this
brief stated:
Legislation is often enacted to meet numerous concerns, not all of which are
articulated, and some of which may even be contradictory. Courts accord-
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The only contemporaneous legislative history of section 526
other than the Conference Report is the record of the ten minute
Senate floor debate which was hasty, confused, and ill-informed. It
provides a classic illustration of why the Supreme Court has held that
congressional debates cannot be used to impair plain statutory language. 39 In various hypothetical situations discussed during the debate, senators indicated that the purpose of section 526 was to
protect a U.S. trademark owner who purchases U.S. trademark rights
40
from an independent foreign company-the Katzel situation.
Other senators' comments, however, clearly refute the notion that
section 526 was intended to apply solely to the specific Katzel facts.
Senator Pomerene, for example, expressly disavowed any intent to
legislate for a particular case, emphasizing that he viewed section
526 as a "declaration of... national policy.' 4 Indeed, the one proponent of the bill who made the effort to describe Katzel
got the facts
42
wrong, and no one felt it necessary to correct him.

Perhaps the clearest evidence of the intended broad meaning of
the bill is provided by the "Wonder Flour Amendment." That
amendment was adopted in response to comments by Senator Lenroot who contended that the bill's language was overbroad and susceptible to manipulation. As one illustration of what he deemed
overbreadth, Senator Lenroot pointed out that U.S. citizens living in
rural areas along the northern border often shopped in nearby Canaingly do not limit the scope of a statute to those concerns expressed in the
legislative history ... [T]he fact that legislation was enacted as the result of a
contemporaneous judicial decision does not mean that the statutory language should be limited precisely to the facts of that decision absent a clear
expression of such limited purpose ....
Brief for the United States of America Amicus Curiae at 8-9, Bell & Howell: Mamiya Co., 719
F.2d at 42.
39 Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102 (1980);
Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979). However, while floor debates are not to be
used to impeach clear and unambiguous statutory language, they may provide strong evidence confirming that such language was understood and intended. See generally 2AJ.
SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 48-13 (4th ed. 1984).
40 E.g., 62 CONG. REC. 11,602-04 (1922) (comments of Senators Sutherland and

McCumber).
41 Id. at 11,603. Other senators made clear their view that the bill went beyond the
specific Katzel facts. For example, Senators Simmons and Pomerene indicated that § 526
would protect certain West Virginians who had purchased a U.S. subsidiary of the German
Bayer Co. from the Alien Property Custodian and wished to exclude other goods with the
"Bayer" mark. Id. at 11,604. They did not state whether the U.S. subsidiary had acquired
the trademark by purchase, gift, or independent activity in the United States. Apparently,
no Senator considered that fact critical. Also, Senator Moses, who opposed the bill, said
that its "main purpose" (as opposed to its "sole" purpose) was to reverse Katzel, thus
clearly implying that other purposes also existed. Id. Moreover, he directed his comments
to the "entire principle" of the Katzel case, thus indicating that the concern went beyond
specific facts or a narrow holding. Id. at 11,603.
42 Senator Sutherland said that the French company which had sold the mark to the
U.S. firm was itself deliberately circumventing the sale by shipping goods to this country.
Id. As previously discussed, the importer actually was a third party who purchased the
goods lawfully abroad from the French Company.

19861

SECTION

526

AND GREY GOODS

dian towns and purchased many goods, such as Wonder Flour, that
were originated and trademarked by U.S. companies. By interfering
he said, the prowith their ability to return home with such goods,
43
posed bill would impose serious inconveniences.
Senator Sutherland, a primary proponent of section 526, agreed
that the broad statutory language would exclude Wonder Flour and
similar goods marked and exported by the U.S. trademark owner.
To avoid the hardship Senator Lenroot identified, the Senate agreed
44
to limit the section to trademarked goods of foreign manufacture.
Clearly, the Senate's adoption of the Wonder Flour Amendment
demonstrates its collective understanding that section 526 would not
operate to exclude goods trademarked by, or with the consent of, the
U.S. trademark owner. Otherwise, no amendment would have been
required, because section 526 would not have impeded the
reimportation of Wonder Flour and similar goods made and marked
by U.S. companies.
Overall, the legislative history of section 526 can best be described as confusing. While some fragmentary evidence may exist to
support the Customs Services' construction of the statute, there is no
evidence of any congressional intent to circumscribe the protection
afforded by its plain language. The confusion surrounding the enactment of the statute certainly fails to rise to the level of "clearly
expressed legislative intention" contrary to the express language of
the statute, as required by the Supreme Court before such language
45
may be disregarded.
Section 526 was reenacted without change as part of the Tariff
Act of 1930.46 This occurred notwithstanding efforts by the Senate

to amend the provision by absolutely prohibiting the importation of
any merchandise having a U.S. trademark. The Senate attempted to
delete the final clause of section 526(a) of the Tariff Act of 1922
which gave U.S. trademark owners the right to consent to the importation of goods having their trademark. The reason behind the effort
was set forth in the Senate Report:
Section 526 of the House Bill contained substantially the same provisions as the corresponding section in the 1922 act. The section
prohibited the importation of merchandise bearing an American
trademark unless written consent of the owner of the trademark was
produced at the time of entry. Your committee believes that where
the laws of the United States protect the interest of a trademark
holder by allowing him a monopoly in the use of the mark, it is reasonable to require as far as practicable, that in return, the holder of
4'4 62 CONC. REC. 11,603 (1922).
44 Id. at 11,605.
45 Consuier Prod. Safety Comm 'n, 447 U.S. at 108.
46 Although § 526 was amended by the Customs Procedural Reform and Simplification

Act of 1978 by adding subsections (d) and (e) thereto, the provision itself was reenacted into
law only once-in 1930. Tariff Act of 1930, § 526, 19 U.S.C. § 1526 (1982).

N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.

[VOL. I I

47
the mark shall manufacture his goods in the United States.

The sponsors of this amendment intended to prohibit importation into the United States of all merchandise bearing U.S. trademarks, regardless of whether the U.S. trademark owner consented to
its importation and regardless of whether the trademark was
purchased by an independent U.S. company from the foreign trademark holder. Otherwise, the proposed amendment would not have
had any effect on the targeted practice of shifting U.S. production
overseas, rendering it meaningless. 48 Ultimately, the Senate backed
9

4
away from the amendment.
The language of the Conference Report relating to the Tariff
Act of 1930 contains no indication that either the House or Senate
viewed section 526 of the Tariff Act of 1922 as applying only to foreign trademarks purchased by U.S. companies unrelated to the for50
eign trademark owner, or as being limited in any other manner.
Supporters of a limited reading of section 526 often refer to remarks
by Senator Reed during the Tariff Act of 1930 debates:

At the present time the tariff laws forbid the importation of an article
bearing a trade-mark registered in America unless the owner of that
trade-mark consents in writing to the importation. Obviously, the
purpose of that provision is to protect the American owner of the
trade-mark against importations of5articles
which have been stamped
1
with his mark without his consent.

Apparently the Government and those supporting its construction
read Senator Reed's final phrase, "without his consent," to modify
"stamped" rather than "importations." Given the statutory language and the broad descriptions of section 526(a) in the committee
reports and on the floor, it is more reasonable to assume that the
statement suffers from a poorly placed modifier. 5 2
C.

The Changing Views of the Customs Service

The first regulation published by the Treasury Department pur47' S. REP. No. 37, 71st Cong., Ist Sess. 75 (1929).

48 The Tariff Act of 1930, also known as the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act, was extraordinarily protectionist legislation and imposed the highest tariff duties in U.S. history.
49 H.R. REP. No. 1326, 71st Cong., 2d Sess., 72 CONG. REC. 7870 (1930).
50 House Report 1326 reads in pertinent part:
Under existing law and the House Bill, the importation of merchandise bearing an American trademark owned by a citizen or corporation of the United
States and registered by a person domiciled in the United States is prohibited
unless written consent of the owner of the trademark is produced at the time
of making entry.
Id.
51 71 CONG. REC. 3,873 (1929).
52 See J'ivitar, 761 F.2d at 1556 n.19. The court of appeals noted that the phrase
"without his consent" could modify either the word "importations" or "stamped." For
this reason, the court stated that this phrase was ambiguous and, therefore, of little
significance.
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suant to section 526 of the Tariff Act of 192253 provided for the exclusion of all foreign goods bearing registered U.S. trademarks,
absent the U.S. trademark owner's written consent. It contained
none of the exceptions which appear in the current Customs Service
regulations. Indeed, article 476 of these regulations contained no
language limiting the scope of section 526. 54 These regulations,

promulgated almost contemporaneously with the enactment of the
section, are more persuasive guides to the meaning of the statute
and the congressional intent than later inconsistent reinterpretations
by the Treasury Department. 5 5 Congress, by enacting section 526 as
part of the Tariff Act of 1930, implicitly ratified its administrative
56
construction.
The contemporaneous administrative construction of section
526 in 1930 is reflected in articles 517-522 of the Customs regulations of 1931. 5 7 Consistent with the statute's plain language, the

regulations required exclusion of all "imported merchandise bearing
a genuine trademark" owned by a U.S. company and registered according to that provision unless the necessary written consent was
obtained. 58 These regulations remained unchanged until 1936 when
59
Customs made significant changes in section 518.

The 1936 amendments to the earlier regulations were promulgated pursuant to both section 526 of the Tariff Act of 1930 and
section 27 of the Trademark Act of 1905.60 This action was the first
53 T.D. 40,380, 46 Treas. Dec. 165 (1923). Article 476 provided in pertinent part:
Trademarks owned by an American citizen or by a corporation or association created or organized within the United States are entitled to the protection of section 526 of the Tariff Act of 1922 if the mark has been registered in
the United States Patent Office by a person (corporation or association) domiciled in the United States, or where trademark rights have been acquired by
assignment, subsequent to original registration, by a person (corporation or
association) domiciled in the United States, if the assignment has been recorded in the Patent Office.
Id.
54 Id.

55 Regulations promulgated contemporaneously with the enactment of a statute are
to be accorded greater weight with respect to the construction of the statute. See Great
Am. R.R. v. United States, 315 U.S. 262, 275-76 (1942); United States v. American Trucking Ass'n, Inc., 310 U.S. 534, 539 (1940).
56 See Tagle v. Ragan, 643 F.2d 1058,1066 n. 10 (5th Cir. 1981); See generally K. DAVIS,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 507 (1958).
57 Cust. Reg. arts. 517-522 (1931).
58 Article 518(a) of the 1931 Customs Regulations provides:
Prohibition of entry.-Entry is prohibited of imported merchandise
bearing a genuine trademark when such trademark is recorded with the
Treasury Department and registered under the trademark law of February
20, 1905, if compliance is had with all provisions of section 526 of the tariff
act of 1930, provided the period of protection for such trademark has not
expired.
Id. art. 518(a).
51) See T.D. 48,537, 70 Treas. Dec. 336 (1936).
"o Id. at 336-37. Section 27 of the Trademark Act of 1905 was the predecessor provision of § 42 of the Lanham Act.
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to merge the two statutory provisions for purposes of Customs administration and enforcement. These regulations, unlike those previously, created a "related parties" exception. Merchandise
manufactured or sold in a foreign country under a properly registered and recorded foreign trademark would not be deemed to
"copy or simulate" U.S. trademarked products if both the foreign
and domestic trademarks were owned by the same person, partnership, association, or corporation. 6 1 The consequence of promulgating one set of regulations to administer and enforce both section
526(a) of the Tariff Act of 1930 and section 27 of the Trademark Act
of 1905 was significant. Indeed, it may have been the most complicating factor in the controversy over grey market trademarked
goods.
The United States Tariff Commission, predecessor agency to the
United States Trade Commission, submitted a memorandum during
hearings on legislation which was to become the Lanham Trademark
Act. 62 The memorandum explained that while section 27 prohibited

the entry of all articles bearing trademarks which infringe a U.S. registered trademark, it did not apply to merchandise bearing the trademark owner's own mark. By contrast, until amended in 1936, section
526 was understood to apply to a trademark owner's own merchandise, and to prohibit the importation of such merchandise without
63
the trademark owner's consent.
In 1953, the Treasury Department again amended the Customs
Regulations, 64 denying U.S. trademark owners the right to prohibit
importations of trademarked goods if domestic and foreign trademarks were owned by "related" companies, as that term was defined
in section 45 of the Lanham Act. 6 5 At the same time, the Justice
61 Id. at 337.

62 Hearings on H.R. 82 Before a Subcommittee on the Committee on Patents, 78th Cong., 2d
Sess. 86-87 (1944).
63 Discussing the effect of the 1936 amendments, the Tariff Commission memorandum explained:
They [the 1936 amendments] also provided that merchandise manufactured
in a foreign country under a trade-mark is not deemed for the purposes of
these regulations to "copy or simulate" such United States trademark if such
foreign trademark and such United States trademark are owned by the same
person .... The foregoing definition is obviously addressed to Section 27 of
the Trade-Mark Act of 1905 in view of the reference to "copy or simulate,"
which expression is used in Section 27 but does not appear in Section 526 of
the tariff act. It is clear that Section 27 of the act of 1905 applies to all merchandise bearing infringing trademarks. It does not apply to the merchan-

dise of the trademark owner since the registrant's goods cannot "copy or
simulate" his own mark. Section 526 of the tariff act does not apply to the
merchandise of the trade-mark owner which bears his trademark if the merchandise was produced abroad and if the trademark owner is a citizen of the
United States.
Id.
6,4 T.D. 53,399, 88 Treas. Dec. 376 (1953).
65 19 C.F.R. § 11.14 (1954).
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Department, apparently without consulting the Customs Service,
filed an antitrust complaint against four U.S. companies alleging a
violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act. 66 It alleged that these

companies had, pursuant to section 526, excluded the importation
into the United States of toilet goods manufactured by their associated French companies. 6 7 The Justice Department's initiation of this
action clearly resulted from the Customs Service practice at that time
of excluding grey market goods from entry into the United States
pursuant to the literal terms of section 526. The Guerlain case ultimately was dismissed at the government's request, 68 and soon thereafter the Customs Service regulations were again amended 6 9 by
deleting the related party exception added in 1953. The Treasury
Department, after narrowing the scope of protection offered by section 526, broadened it by denying its protection only when both the
foreign and U.S. trademarks were owned by the same person.
In the late 1960s the Treasury Department began to limit the
scope of protection offered by section 526. The first public notice of
this came with the publication of Treasury Decision 69-12(2),70
which stated:
The trademark or trade name on imported foreign-produced merchandise shall not be deemed to copy or simulate a registered trademark or trade name, if the foreign producer is the parent or
subsidiary of the American owner or the firms are under a common
control. Further, if a foreign producer has been authorized by the
American owner to produce and sell goods abroad bearing the reproduced and sold
corded trademark or trade
7 1 name, merchandise so
is deemed admissible.
In December 1970, the Treasury Department published a Notice

of Proposed Rulemaking which proposed incorporating the administratively created restrictions to section 526, set forth in T.D. 6912(2), into the Customs Service regulations. 7 2 In October 1972, final
regulations accomplishing this incorporation were published. 7 3 In
neither of the Federal Register notices was an explanation given for
this narrowing of the protection offered by section 526. These regu66 Sherman Act § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
67 United States v. Guerlain, Inc., 155 F. Supp. 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), prob. junis, noted
sub nor. Lanvin, Parfums, Inc. v. United States, 355 U.S. 951, cert. denied, 357 U.S. 924,
vacated and remanded sub non. Guerlain, Inc. v. United States, 358 U.S. 915 (1958), dismissed,
172 F. Supp. 107 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
6(8 172 F. Supp. at 107. Immediately after the dismissal of Guerlain, the government
introduced legislation which would have repealed § 526 and revised § 42 of the Lanham
Trademark Act. This legislation (H.R. 7234, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959), the Cellar Bill)

was never enacted into law.
69 T.D. 54,932, 94 Treas. Dec. 433 (1959).
70 T.D. 69-12(2), 3 Cust. B. 17 (1969).
71 Id.
72 35 Fed. Reg. 19,270 (1970) (to be codified at 19 C.F.R. § 133.0-.53 (1972)).
73 19 C.F.R. § 133.0-.53 (1972).
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lations are currently in effect. 7"
III.

Judicial Construction of Section 526

Although it has been the focus of substantial litigation since the
early 1980s, section 526(a) of the Tariff Act of 1930 (and its predecessor provision in the Tariff Act of 1922) escaped extensive judicial
scrutiny during the first 60 years of its existence. Interestingly, section 526(a) was the subject of litigation within a year of its 1922 enactment 75 but was not again considered by a court until shortly after
its reenactment as part of the Tariff Act of 1930.76 The 1956 decision in United States v. Guerlain, Inc. 77 involved an antitrust action
brought by the Justice Department against companies which were using section 526(a) to prevent the unauthorized importation of trademarked goods, a use of the statute which the Antitrust Division felt
violated antitrust laws. Eventually, the Supreme Court dismissed the
suit with prejudice7 8 after hearing the government's request that the
case be vacated and remanded to the district court. 79 A few decisions in the 1960s and 1970s mentioned section 526 but only tangentially.8 0 However, with the growing controversy over the grey
market, section 526 has recently come under intense judicial
scrutiny.
A.

The First Sixty Years: 1922-1982

During the first sixty years of its existence, section 526(a) was
the subject of considered judicial study and analysis on only three
occasions: in 1923 in Coty, Inc. v. Le Blume Import Co., 8s in 1931 in
Sturges v. Clark D. Pease, Inc.,82 and in 1957-1959 in United States v.
Guerlain, Inc..83 In the first two cases, the courts concluded that Congress intended no exceptions to the scope of protection afforded by
the plain language of the statute. The district court in Guerlain took
the opposite view, but the case was ultimately dismissed with prejudice, detracting from the significance of the court's opinion.
74 Id.

75 See Coty, Inc. v. Le Blume Import Co., Inc., 292 F. 264 (S.D.N.Y.), aft'd, 293 F. 344
(2d Cir. 1923).
76 See Sturges v. Clark D. Pease, Inc., 48 F.2d 1035 (2d Cir. 1931).
77 155 F. Supp. at 77.

78 172 F. Supp. at 107.
711358 U.S. at 915.
80 See Rogers v. Ercona Camera Corp., 277 F.2d 94 (D.C. Cir. 1960); Mendez v.
Faber, Coe & Gregg, Inc., 345 F. Supp. 527 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); R.C.W. Supervisor, Inc. v.
Cuban Tobacco Co., 229 F. Supp. 453 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
81 292 F. 264 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 293 F. 344 (2d Cir. 1923).
82 48 F.2d 1035 (2d Cir. 1931).
8" 155 F. Supp. at 77.
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Coty, Inc. v. Le Blume Import Co.

Coty, Inc.8 4 actually involved two separate lawsuits. The first
dealt with plaintiff Coty, a French perfumer who formed a Delaware
corporation to conduct his U.S. business. Part of that business consisted of the sale of a perfume under the registered trademarked
name "L'Origan." Defendant Le Blume, a New York corporation,
proposed marketing a perfume in the United States similar in scent
to plaintiff's "L'Origan." Defendant's perfume, produced by a
French manufacturer, was to be sold under the name "Origan."
Coty moved for a temporary injunction prohibiting the use of the
8 5
word "Origan" in connection with the sale of Le Blume's product.
In the second case, Le Blume brought an action to compel Coty
to withdraw his notice to the Collector of Customs at the Port of New
York under which the Collector was withholding entry of two parcels
of Le Blume's perfume. Le Blume also sought to compel the Collector of Customs to release the merchandise. Coty prevented the entry
under section 27 of the Trademark Act of 1905 claiming that it had
the sole right to sell merchandise designated as "Origan" perfume in
86
the United States.
The district court ruled on three separate motions: Coty's motion for a temporary injunction, Le Blume's motion to compel Coty
to withdraw his notice to the Collector of Customs and to compel the
Collector to release its goods, and Coty's motion to dismiss Le
Blume's suit. 8 7 Judge Learned Hand granted Coty's motion for an
injunction in the first case, denied Le Blume's motion for injunction
in the second and denied Coty's motion to dismiss Le Blume's suit.
The court noted that section 526(a) was "intended only to supply the
casus omissus supposed to exist in Section 27 of the Act of 1905"
resulting from the Second Circuit Court of Appeals decision in A.
Bourois & Co. v. Katzel. s s Judge Hand went on to state that "[h]ad
the Supreme Court reversed that decision [Katzel] last spring, it [section 526] would not have been enacted at all." '8 9 Judge Hand stated
that section 526 was not meant to prevent a person from testing the
validity of a trademark in the courts, and therefore would not grant
Coty's motion to dismiss. 90 These rulings were all affirmed on
appeal. 9 1
Perhaps the most significant aspect of Coty is what was not said
in the opinion. The court does not address whether Coty, a subsidi84 292 F. at 264.
85 Id. at 265.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Id. at 268-69.
89 id. at 269.
90 Id.
91 Coty, 292 F. at 344.
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ary of a French corporation, would be eligible to rely on section 526.
Had the scope of protection offered by the statute been limited
solely to companies in a position similar to A. Bourjois & Co., a position which Coty was not in, resort to section 526 would have been
inappropriate. It is reasonable to assume that the court, clearly
aware of the events leading to the enactment of section 526,92 would
have made reference to this fact.
2.

Sturges v. Clark D. Pease, Inc.

Shortly after Congress reenacted section 526 as part of the
Tariff Act of 1930, the Second Circuit scrutinized the statute in a
case involving the attempted importation of a Hispano-Suiza automobile that the plaintiff purchased in France. 93 Because the car bore
the trademark "H-S," which the defendant had properly registered
and recorded, the Collector of Customs denied it entry. Sturges argued that section 526(a), upon which the Collector relied, did not
apply to articles intended for personal use. Plaintiff further argued
that if the statute covered such articles, the statute was unconstitutional. The district court dismissed both arguments, and the plaintiff
94
appealed.
The thrust of Sturges' appeal concerned section 526(a)'s definition of "merchandise." Plaintiff contended that the term covered
only goods that were imported for domestic sale, not goods that
were imported for personal use. 9 5 Sturges argued that Congress
adopted section 526(a) solely to avoid the result in A. Bouqrois & Co.
v. Katzel, 96 with the scope of the import provision limited to the facts
of that case. The appellate court acknowledged, as had the court in
Coty, 9 7 that Katzel inspired the enactment of section 526. It further

acknowledged that had the Supreme Court reversed Katzel prior to
the enactment of the Tariff Act of 1922, section 526 would never
have been enacted. 98 The court stated, however, that "this fact does
not settle the scope of the act." 9 9
The court noted that the plaintiff had the right to import the
automobile in question if the trademark were removed, stating that
section 526 did not prevent the importation of the automobile itself
but only an automobile bearing the "H-S" trademark. According to
the court, "[t]he object of this drastic statute is to protect the owner
92 The court acknowledged that § 526 was enacted as a result of the Second Circuit's
decision in the Katzel case. 292 F. at 269.
93 Sturges, 48 F.2d at 1035.
94 Id. at 1036.
95 Id. at 1036-37.
96 Id. at 1037.

97 292 F. at 269.
98 48 F.2d at 1037.
99 Id.

1986]

SECTION

526

AND GREY GOODS

of a foreign trademark from competition in respect to goods bearing
the mark."' 0 0 The court held that if importations for personal use
were excepted from the coverage of section 526, an opportunity
would be afforded for "evasive importations" whose real objective
was sale. The court, therefore, reiterated its view that unauthorized
sales in the United States of automobiles bearing the "H-S" trademark interfered with the U.S. trademark owner's "right to control
the use of the mark in this country which was the apparent purpose
of the Congressional legislation." 1'0 The court concluded that the
domestic owner of a trademark "is entitled" to the benefit of all sales
in the United States of merchandise bearing that trademark and that
to ensure this benefit, the owner of a U.S. trademark "is given control of the importation of all .

.

. [goods] bearing

it."102

Sturges is important for both what it says and what it does not
say. The court of appeals acknowledged that section 526 is a "drastic" statute, thereby lending credence to its view that the statute allows no exception. The court's opinion contains no discussion of
whether Clark D. Pease, Inc. was in any way related to the foreign
trademark owner. It contains no acknowledgment of an exception to
the import prohibition contained in section 526 when the U.S. trademark owner is related to the foreign owner. Indeed, this court,
which rejected even a relatively minor exception to the statute for
personal use,' 0 3 would have been unlikely to have allowed the much
larger exception carved out by the Customs Service in its present
regulations. These exceptions allow importation of foreign goods
bearing a trademark owned by a U.S. citizen if the trademarked
goods were manufactured overseas by a company related to the U.S.
trademark was applied to the goods on
trademark owner, or if the
4
10
authority of that owner.

3.

United States v. Guerlain, Inc.

Guerlain,'0 5 the next significant case construing section 526
arose not in the customs context, but in an antitrust context. In
1956, the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice filed separate lawsuits against three individual U.S. importers of French per100 Id. (Emphasis added). It should be noted that the court of appeals not once, but
twice, during the course of its opinion referred to § 526 as a "drastic" statute.
101 Id.

102 Id.
103 It was not until 1978, with the enactment of the Customs Procedural Reform and
Simplification Act, that § 526 was amended by adding a personal use exemption (subsection (d)) to the statute. Customs Procedural Reform and Simplification Act, Pub. L. No.
95-410, 92 Stat. 888, 903 (1978).
104 See 19 C.F.R. § 133.21(c)(1)-(3) (1985).
105 155 F. Supp. 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), prob. jurisd noted sub nom. Lanvin, Parfums, Inc. v.
United States, 355 U.S. 951, cert. denied, 357 U.S. 924, vacated and remandedsub nom. 358 U.S.
915 (1958), dismissed, 172 F. Supp. 107 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
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fume, 0 6 contending that their use of section 526 to prevent third
party importation of French perfume bearing their respective trademarks violated section 2 of the Sherman Act.' 0 7 The suits alleged
that such use of the statute constituted an attempt to monopolize,
and a monopolization of, the importation into and sale within the
United States of these trademarked products.10 8 These lawsuits were
initiated without consultation with the Customs Service which at that
time was prohibiting such goods from entry pursuant to the terms of
Section 526(a).10 9 The underlying basis of the Government's action
was a theory that the U.S. trademark owners were part of a "single
international enterprise" with their French suppliers. 10 As part of
such an enterprise, U.S. trademark owners were not entitled to use
section 526 to prevent the importation of goods sold abroad by the
French counterpart. According to the Department of Justice, such
use of section 526 violated the prohibition contained in section 2 of
the Sherman Act against monopolization."I'
The court, after finding that each of the three defendants was
part of a single ,international enterprise with its French counterpart, 1 2 went on to examine the statute. The court accepted the
Government's construction of section 526(a) and held that the protections of the statute may be applied only to the advantage of an
independent U.S. trademark owner and not to a U.S. participant in a
single international enterprise." 1 3 The court did acknowledge that
this reading of section 526(a) "is not to be derived from a literal
reading of the words of the statute," and that it had arrived at its
conclusion "[d]espite the absence of specific language to that effect
in the legislation." ' 1 4 The court, after examining the legislative history of section 526, determined that its purpose was to protect the
rights of U.S. citizens who bought foreign trademarks and that it was
"aimed at the Katzel decision .

.

. involving a U.S. trademark owner

independent of the foreign manufacturer." ' " 5 The court also rejected defendants' arguments that by not permitting them to take
106 These three companies were Guerlain, Inc., Parfums Corday, Inc., and Lanvin
Parfums, Inc. Each had the exclusive right to distribute French manufactured perfume
products in the United States and had been assigned rights in the trademarks under which
these perfumes were sold. This enabled each of them to claim ownership of the trademarks in the United States and to register and record their respective trademarks. The
three suits against the individual importers were consolidated into one case. 155 F. Supp.
at 79.
107 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
108 155 F. Supp. at 79.
101 172 F. Supp. at 107-08.
110 155 F. Supp. at 79-80.
III Id. at 80.
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 Id.
115 Id. at 81 (footnote omitted). The court cited both Coty and S/urges to support this

conclusion. With respect to the latter case, the court apparently failed to note the state-
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advantage of section 526, others would be able to "free ride" on
their trademarks by usurping the benefits of the goodwill associated
with the mark and built at the expense of the individual trademark
owners. 1 1 6 The court concluded that the protection sought by the
defendants would constitute an implied exception to the antitrust
laws (which are not favored) that it did not believe Congress meant
to grant to an international enterprise.' 17 The court then held that
defendants did not have the right to rely on section 526 to prevent
the unauthorized importation of genuine trademarked goods and
that defendants' use of the provision violated section 2 of the Sherman Act.1 18
This decision was appealed directly to the Supreme Court,
which undertook to review the case. 1 9 Before the case could be
heard by the Court, however, the Government filed a motion to vacate the judgment and to remand the case to the district court for
consideration of a motion to dismiss, which the Government said it
would file with the district court. 120 The Solicitor General's explanation for the Government's action' 2 ' was based on the intragovernmental conflict between the Customs and antitrust authorities with
ment by the court of appeals that the fact that § 526 was enacted in response to Katzel
"does not settle the scope of the act." Sturges, 48 F.2d at 1037.
116 155 F. Supp. at 82.
117 Id. at 83.
118 Id. at 87.
119 355 U.S. at 951.
120 See Motion to VacateJudgment and to Remand to the District Court for Consideration of Motion to Dismiss to be Filed by the United States, Guerlain.
121 The Government is of the view that [the district court's] interpretation [of
§ 526] is permissible in light of the relevant legislative history noted in the
District Court's opinion. At the same time, we are bound to recognize that
this interpretation is not supported by the literal terms of the statute. Moreover, the physical exclusion of goods which has been taking place has occurred with the continuing aid of the Customs authorities of the United
States who have deemed themselves legally constrained to grant the claim of
statutory protection invoked by the appellants. To be sure, an antitrust complaint is not barred merely because actions taken by certain officials of the
United States may be involved in the effectuation of the alleged Sherman Act
violation. Nonetheless, it appears desirable, in the circumstances here present, that the intra-governmental conflict as to the meaning of the tariff or
trademark laws of the United States be resolved, if such resolution can be
practicably achieved, through means other than antitrust litigation.
To this end, general agreement has now been reached within the Executive Branch that the matter should be promptly submitted to Congress for its
consideration.
Id.at 7.
Immediately after the dismissal of the Guerlain case, the Government introduced legislation which would have repealed § 526 and revised § 42 of the Lanham Act. These measures were aimed at barring the importation of counterfeit goods while explicitly providing
that the Lanham Act remedies were not available against an importer or seller of foreignmade goods bearing a U.S.-owned trademark where the U.S. trademark owner and foreign
manufacturer are related, or the foreign manufacturer was authorized to use the trademark. The Cellar Bill was never enacted into law. Had § 526 been construed and administered then as it is now, the introduction of such legislation would have been unnecessary.
H.R. 7234, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959).
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regard to section 526. The Supreme Court granted the Government's motion,' 22 and on remand to the district court, the case was
dismissed with prejudice. 12 3 The current Customs regulations 124 are
based on the construction given to section 526 by the district
court.'

25

dice, 126

Although the case was ultimately dismissed with preju-

the Customs Service continued to adhere to the district
court's holding in Guerlain on the grounds that the rationale enunciated by that court had never been repudiated and remained the only
12 7
judicial statement relating to that section.
In Guerlain the district court accepted the view of the Antitrust
Division of the Department of Justice that the U.S. subsidiary of a
multinational "single enterprise" could not use section 526 to prevent domestic intrabrand competition in genuine merchandise manufactured by related foreign companies. Adoption of this related
party exception was in harmony with the view, prevalent in the 1960s
and 1970s, that the imposition of restrictions on the distribution of
products by manufacturers after their release into commerce was a
per se violation of the Sherman Act.12 8 Therefore, although the propriety of the Customs Service's acceptance of the related party exception to section 526 was questionable given the legislative history
and broad language of the statute, the policy behind its action was at
least consistent with prevailing principles of antitrust law.
In 1977, however, the Supreme Court reversed United States v.
Arnold Schwinn & Co. ,129 holding that intrabrandrestraints on distribution may actually enhance interbrand competition.' 30 Subsequent
cases in the circuit courts of appeals have expanded upon this analysis, holding that intrabrand restrictions by manufacturers lacking significant market power cannot be anticompetitive because other
brands provide an effective competitive check. 13 1 There has thus
been a complete reversal of the underlying economic theory and antitrust principles regarding intrabrand competition since the Government decided to vacate its Guerlain appeal in the Supreme Court and
122 358 U.S. at 915.

123 172 F. Supp. at 107. The court noted that the Government's attempt to limit the
scope of protection afforded by § 526 utilizing the antitrust laws was "clumsy, particularly
in view of the fact that the Government was, through the Collector of Customs, allowing
the exclusion that it claimed, through the Antitrust Division, to be illegal." Id. at 107-08.
124 19 C.F.R. § 133.21(c)(1)-(3) (1986).
125 155 F. Supp. at 80.
126 172 F. Supp. at 107.
127 See Atwood, Import Restrictions on Trademarked Merchandise-The Roe of the United
States Bureau of Customs, 59 TRADE-MARK REP. 301 (1969).

128 See United States v. Arnold Schwinn & Co., 338 U.S. 365 (1967).
129 Id.
130 Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 361 (1977).
131 See Valley Liquors, Inc. v. Renfield Importers, Ltd., 678 F.2d 742 (7th Cir. 1982);
Center, Inc. v. Roddell, Inc., 673 F.2d 786 (5th Cir. 1982); Oreck Corp. v. Whirlpool
Corp., 639 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1980); Borger v. Yamaha Int'l Corp., 622 F.2d 390 (2d Cir.
1980).
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introduce legislation (the Cellar Bill) proposing the repeal of section
526.132 This complete reversal of the law relating to vertical restraints has been recognized by the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice,' 3 3 and explains why, in the amicus curiae brief it
filed in Bell & Howell: Mamiya Co. v. Masel Supply Co., 134 it reversed its
position on section 526, urging the court to "affirm the ... customs
laws in accord with the normal meaning of the statutory

language."
B.

13 5

The 1980s: Growing Controversy, Increasing Litigation

After the dismissal of Guerlain, the scope of protection afforded
by section 526 was not again the subject of judicial analysis until the
1980s.136 The section has increasingly become an issue in litigation
as the size of the grey market has increased 1 3 7 and the controversy
over the legitimacy of grey market trademarked goods has grown.
Judicial examination of the scope of protection afforded by section
526 first resurfaced in litigation under section 32 of the Lanham
Trademark Act, 13 8 with plaintiffs seeking injunctive relief from trademark infringement by grey market trademarked goods. 13 9 These
suits indirectly raised questions of the proper scope of protection
afforded by section 526(a) and whether the Customs Service regulations correctly reflected this scope. These actions, however, were directed against identified importers of goods bearing a specific
132 H.R. 7234, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959).
133 See Vertical Restraints Guidelines, U.S. Department ofJustice at 14-15 (January 23,
1985).
134 548 F. Supp. 1063 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), vacated and remanded, 719 F.2d 42 (2d Cir.
1983).
135 Brief for the United States of America Amicus Curiae at 9. See generally id. at 7-9. It
should be emphasized that this brief was submitted jointly by the Antitrust Division of the
Department ofJustice and the U.S. Customs Service. In Vivitar the Government attempted
to distance itself from the position set forth in the Masel amicus curiae brief by arguing that
the Masel brief was prepared by the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department, not the
Civil Division, which was litigating Vivitar. It was argued that the Civil Division was not
bound by the views of the Antitrust Division. Defendants' Memorandum In Support Of
Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment at 2, Vivitar. Whatever merit this distinction
might have, it nevertheless overlooks the fact that the Customs Service was a joint author
of the brief. In Vivitar the Court of International Trade found that the amicus brief filed in
the Masel litigation did not demonstrate any inconsistency on the part of the Government.
593 F. Supp. at 431 n.17. The court held that the brief focused on issues of trademark
infringement and antitrust law, and mentioned § 526(a) "only in passing," although 3 of
12 pages were devoted to substantive arguments related to the construction of the section.
Id. 1d6 Section 526 was
tangentially mentioned in a few court decisions during the 1960s
and 197 0s, but these cases did not examine the scope of protection afforded by the statute.
See Rogers, 277 F.2d at 94; Mendez, 345 F. Supp. at 527; R.C. IV. Supervisor, 229 F. Supp. at
453.
137 See supra note I and accompanying text.
138 Lanham Trademark Act, ch. 540, § 32, 60 Stat. 427, 437 (1946) (current version at
15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1982)).
139 See Osawa, 589 F. Supp. at 1163; Mamiya, 548 F. Supp. at 1061.
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trademark. 140 The question of the scope of protection provided to
U.S. trademark owners under section 526 was not directly raised nor
was the legitimacy of the Customs Service regulations excepting certain U.S. trademark owners from the protection offered by the statute challenged.
Not until Vivitar Corp. v. United States 141 were the Customs regulations directly challenged and the question of the scope of protection afforded by section 526 brought directly before a court with
jurisdiction to address the controversy. 14 2 Soon thereafter, similar
suits were filed by both COPIAT 143 and Olympus Corporation 14 4 in
the district court. 14 5
1. Mamiya and Osawa
In Mamiya 146 plaintiff brought an action under section 32 of the
Lanham Trademark Act of 1946147 to enjoin the defendants from
importing genuine "Mamiya" cameras, bearing the "Mamiya" trademark. Plaintiff held the exclusive right to U.S. distribution of these
cameras, manufactured in Japan by Mamiya Camera Co. and distributed worldwide by J. Osawa & Co.148 The district court, in granting

the preliminary injunction, 149 thoroughly analyzed section 526 from
the enactment of section 27 of the Trademark Act of 1905 to the
interpretation of Guerlain. The Mamiya court expressly rejected the
Guerlain related party exception.
Although the Mamiya court conceded that the legislative history
of section 526 indicated "that the plight of trademark assignees in
140 See infra p. 272.
141 593 F. Supp. 420 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984), aff'd, 761 F.2d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 106 S. Ct. 791 (1986).
142 The U.S. Court of International Trade stated that it had exclusive jurisdiction to
decide this issue. Vivitar, 585 F. Supp. at 1419. The exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of
International Trade was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. 761
F.2d at 1557-60.
143 COPIAT, 585 F. Supp. at 844.
144 Olympus, 627 F. Supp. at 911.
145 It should be noted that the U.S. district courts in both COPIAT and Olympus declined to follow the Vivitar court's holding that exclusive jurisdiction over claims arising
out of § 526 was vested in the U.S. Court of International Trade, and found that they
possessed jurisdiction to review such claims. The question of whether the Court of International Trade has exclusive jurisdiction to hear such claims, or whether such claims can
also be heard by the district courts, remains unresolved.
146 Mamiya, 548 F. Supp. at 1063.
147 Lanham Trademark Act, ch. 540, § 32, 60 Stat. 427, 437 (1946) (current version at
15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1982)).
148 548 F. Supp. at 1065. During the pendency of this litigation, plaintiff changed its
name to Osawa & Co. but remained a Delaware corporation and the owner of the U.S.
"Mamiya" trademarks. Id.
149 Id. at 1079. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals vacated and remanded this decision solely on the grounds that it did not believe plaintiffs had demonstrated sufficient
irreparable injury to warrant the district court's issuance of a preliminary injunction, 719
F.2d at 45-46, without discussing the substance of the lower court's analysis. 719 F.2d at
42.
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the Bourjois Company's situation was a special concern to Congress,"' 15 0 it also noted that the factual situation of that case was
"partially misrepresented" by the bill's proponents.' 5 1 The court
stated, however, that the possibility that individual senators did not
have a completely accurate understanding of the Katzel case could
not "weigh heavily in construing the statute when the breadth of the
' 52
legislation is properly considered."'
After citing the basic rule of statutory construction that the plain
meaning of words selected by Congress is ordinarily conclusive evidence of the scope of the statute,' 5 3 the court stated:
Section 526 conferred upon citizens of the United States, including
corporations created here, the right to bar importation generally.
The language does not reasonably admit of a special limitation
based upon foreign ownership of an American company. An American subsidiary of a foreign company is no less American for being a
foreign company's subsidiary....
Again, without limiting language, Congress stated that "any merchandise of foreign manufacture" bearing a trademark owned by an
American could be denied entry, on the unstated, but obvious
ground that sale of the article by someone not154
the trademark owner
would infringe the trademark owner's rights.
The Mamiya court concluded that the district court's analysis of section 526 in Guerlain "does not provide persuasive reasoning for narrowing either the scope of Bourjois v. Katzel or of section 526 to
instances where the American trademark owner is unrelated to the
15 5
foreign producer."'
The district court's grant of a preliminary injunction was appealed, and the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice and
the Customs Service filed a joint amicus curiae brief with the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals. TheJustice Department and Customs Service claimed that section 526 should be construed in accordance with
its plain language and that the legislative history of section 526 did
not support a construction giving U.S. trademark owners less protection than that seemingly granted by the plain language of the statute. 156 The court of appeals vacated and remanded the trial court's
judgment because the plaintiff failed to prove a sufficiently irrepara15 7
ble injury necessary for the issuance of a preliminary injunction.
The case initially proceeded toward trial but ultimately was dis58
missed pursuant to the terms of a consent decree.'
150 548 F. Supp. at 1075.
151 Id.
152 Id.
153 Id.

154 Id. at 1075-76.
.55 Id. at 1077.
I-" Brief for the United States of America Amicus Curiae at 7-9.

157 719 F.2d at 42.
158 See Berkey Photo, Inc. v. B & A Photo, No. 83-6874 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 9, 1984).
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Osawa & Co. brought another suit 1 59 against defendants who

were importing and selling genuine cameras bearing the "Mamiya"
trademark in the United States without authorization. Although the
Customs Service had ordered the exclusion of this merchandise,
plaintiff sought preliminarily to enjoin defendants from advertising
and dealing in the goods. 1 60 Defendants claimed that the Customs
Service recordation of the trademarks at issue was erroneous and
contrary to its own regulations given the relationship between the
U.S. trademark owner and the Japanese manufacturer. The court rejected this claim 61 and defendants' contention that section 526
should be limited to situations in which the domestic trademark
holder had purchased the U.S. trademark and goodwill outright and
had no relation to the foreign trademark owner. Finding "no basis
for this contention in fact or logic," 1 62 the court further stated:

And as to the Exclusion Act, § 526, defendants' attempt to contradict its plain meaning by snatching at fragments from its legislative
history is unconvincing. The fact that it was passed to overturn the
Court of Appeals decision in Katzel does not mean that, in spite of its
broad language, it should govern only the narrowest version of the
Katzel facts. Defendants have suggested 163
no compelling reason to
doubt that the statute means what it says.

Additionally, the Osawa court rejected defendants' contention
that the denial of Coty's motion to dismiss Le Blume's suit in Coty,

Inc. v. Le Blume Import Co., Inc. 164 supported a narrow construction of
section 526(a). 16 5 Instead, the court explained that Coty supported a
broad construction of the statute. 16 6 The Osawa court focused on
Judge Hand's statement in Coty that section 526(a) was intended only
to supply the "casus omissus" which supposedly existed in section 27
of the Trademark Act of 1905.167 It noted that prior to Coty and
Katzel, section 27 had been construed by the Second Circuit Court of

Appeals 168 as denying a U.S. trademark owner the right to exclude
merchandise bearing the genuine trademark of a foreign manufacturer, and that the court of appeals in Katzel had merely reconfirmed
this. 16 9 In reversing Katzel, the Supreme Court had found an in15, Osawa, 589 F. Supp. at 1163.
160 Id.
161 Id. at 1177.
162

Id. at 1175.

163 Id.
164 292 F. at 268.
165 589 F. Supp. at 1175.
166 Id.
167 292 F. at 268-69.

1" See Fred Gretsch Mfg. Co. v. Schoening, 238 F. 780 (2d Cir. 1916).
1 91.
589 F. Supp. at 1175. This holding was based on the fact that § 27 spoke in terms
of excluding imported goods which "copy or simulate" a U.S. registered trademark, and
genuine goods do neither. See Gretsch, 238 F. at 780.
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fringement despite the "genuineness" of the imported goods. 170
Thus, the Osawa court stated that the "casus omissus" which section
526 was drafted to address was the importation of genuine goods
with foreign trademarks without the consent of U.S. trademark owners. 17 1 The court noted that this omission had been addressed by
both the enactment of section 526 and the Supreme Court's decision
in Katzel.' 72 It further concluded:
There is absolutely no basis in Hand's language for the suggestion
argued by defendants that it refers only to the arm's length relationship between the domestic and foreign markholders in Katzel. In
fact, it must mean the opposite. For it is clear (and beyond dispute)
that exclusion lay under § 27 against goods that "copy or simulate"
regardless of the relationship between the domestic and the foreign
mark holder. Such a relationship could have no conceivable relevance to the unlawfulness of a counterfeit mark. If, as Judge Hand
states, § 526 simply fills the omission supposed to exist in § 27, then
the relationship between foreign and domestic markholder would be
equally irrelevant under § 526.173
The Osawa court then proceeded to examine the Customs Service regulations 174 under which an order had been issued excluding
imports of genuine goods not authorized by plaintiff.' 7 5 In what is
concededly dicta, the Osawa court stated:
The language of the statute broadly and unqualifiedly proclaims the
unlawfulness of importing "any merchandise of foreign manufacture
...[that] bears a trademark owned by a citizen of, or by a corporation or association created or organized within, the United States
....
It contains no suggestion that the right of the U.S.
markholder to receive its benefits depends176
on subtle variations in its
relationship with the foreign markholder.
Noting that the Customs regulations represented an effort by
the Customs Service to implement its perception of antitrust policy,1 77 the court observed that "nothing in the statute suggests that
Congress conferred authority on the Bureau of Customs to condition
its benefits on Customs' analysis of antitrust policy,"' 78 and ques' 79
tioned the "wisdom and necessity" of "these crude regulations."'
The court remonstrated that antitrust questions are far too complex
to be decided through a short questionnaire on corporate ownership
and questioned the propriety of regulations which presumed anti170 A. Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel, 260 U.S. 689 (1923); See also A. Bourjois & Co. v.
Aldridge, 263 U.S. 675 (1923).
171 589 F. Supp. at 1175.
172 Id.
173 Id. at 1175-76.

174 19 C.F.R. § 133.21(c)(i)-(3) (1986).
175 589 F. Supp. at 1176-78.
176 Id. at 1177.
177 Id. The court cited Atwood, supra note 127. See supra note 127 and accompanying
text.
178 589 F. Supp. at 1177.
17! Id.
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trust violations solely on the basis of common ownership and control
with no reference to market considerations. 8 0 Finally, the court
concluded that these regulations were "unsound both as antitrust
policy and trademark law."''
2.

Vivitar, COPIAT and Olympus

The Vivitar, COPIA T and Olympus cases are the only cases which
directly challenged the Customs Service regulations and their limits
on U.S. trademark protection under section 526. These cases were
filed only after the U.S. trademark owners' 8 2 repeatedly failed to
convince the Customs Service to provide protection from grey market imports. The Customs Service refused to bar the importation by
third parties of goods bearing U.S.-registered trademarks because
the goods were manufactured overseas by entities related to or authorized by the U.S. trademark owners.' 8 3 The Vivitar case, the first
filed, is the only one of these cases now concluded. More importantly, the analysis of section 526 made by the trial court in Vivitar is
18 4
far more comprehensive than that in either COPIAT or Olympus.
a.

Vivitar Corporation v. United States

185

18 6
CusVivitar Corporation filed suit to have declared ultra vires
toms Service regulations which deny statutory protection to U.S.
trademark owners who are related to foreign manufacturers of trademarked goods 187 or who have authorized such manufacturers to
place their trademark on such goods.18 8 Vivitar had three arguments. 18 9 First, it argued that the Customs Service regulations were
ultra vires to the extent they were contrary to the unambiguous language contained in section 526, and that the legislative history of
section 526 did not clearly evidence a congressional intent contrary
180 Id. at 1178.
181 Id.

182 COPIAT is a coalition of U.S. trademark owners, all plagued by grey market
imports.
183 See 19 C.F.R. § 133.21(c)(1)-(3) (1986).
184 The appellate court decisions in both Vivitar and COPIAT contained comprehensive analyses of § 526. The COPIAT and Olympus district court decisions, however, were
not as comprehensive as that of the Vivitar court, and in fact relied heavily on the Vivitar
opinions and incorporated by reference much of the analysis contained therein.
185 593 F. Supp. 420 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984), aff'd, 761 F.2d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 106 S. Ct. 791 (1986).
186 593 F. Supp. at 423.
187 19 C.F.R. § 133.21(c)(l)-(2) (1986).
188 Id. § 133.21 (c)(3). Vivitar initially sought an order of mandamus from the Court of
International Trade directing the Customs Service to exclude from entry into the United
States goods bearing the "Vivitar" trademark without its authorization, but later amended
its complaint to seek declaratory relief as well. 593 F. Supp. at 422 n.I.
1" 593 F. Supp. at 425. These three arguments also constitute the thrust of COPIAT
and Olympus' arguments.
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to the statutory language. 190 Second, it argued that the Customs Service regulations at issue were neither longstanding nor consistent
and therefore were entitled to little deference by the court.' 9 Finally, it believed Congress did not intend to approve the Customs
Service regulations when it amended section 526 in 1978.192
The Court of International Trade rejected Vivitar's claims, finding that the legislative history of section 526 demonstrated congressional intent that the statute only remedy the result of the court of
appeals decision in Katzel, at that time still not reversed by the
Supreme Court. 1 93 Further, the Court of International Trade found
that the Customs Service's construction of section 526 had been consistently applied since at least 1962 and probably reflected a general
194
practice since 1936 and was therefore entitled substantial weight.
Finally, the court determined that Congress had been aware of the
Customs Service's administrative practice under section 526, and
had acquiesced in the practice' 9 5 by enacting the Customs Procedural Reform and Simplification Act of 1978.196 Based on this analysis, the Court of International Trade held that the Customs Service
regulations represented "a reasonable construction [of section
526(a)], reflecting Congress' intent, and in fact is a necessary construction of the statute to avoid results Congress clearly did not
97
intend."1
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the conclusion that the Customs Service regulations were a reasonable exercise of administrative discretion 19 8 but found that the reasons
adopted by the Court of International Trade in supporting the Customs Service's construction of section 526 were without merit. The
court of appeals stated that the sole purpose of section 526 was not
to remedy the dilemma created by Katzel.' 99 The Vivitar court cited
Sturges v. Clark D. Pease, Inc. ,200 decided contemporaneously with the
reenactment of section 526, in support of the proposition that Con190 Id. As previously noted, the Customs Service took the position that the legislative
history evidenced an intent by Congress to limit the scope of § 526 to the Katzel fact situation, despite the broad language utilized by Congress in enacting the statute. Id.
19,1 Id. at 431 n.17. The Customs Service also argued that its construction of§ 526 has
been longstanding and consistent, dating back to the 1936 amendments to the Customs
Regulations of 1931. Id. at 425.
192 Id. at 433 n.19. The Customs Service argued that Congress, when enacting the
Customs Procedural Reform and Simplification Act of 1978, by which § 526 was amended
by adding new subsections (d) and (e), implicitly ratified Customs' administrative construction of the statute. Id. at 425.
"93 Id. at 426-28.
194 Id. at 432.
19 5 Id. at 433.
19(; 19 U.S.C. § 1526(d)-(e) (1982).
197 593 F. Supp. at 434.
198 761 F.2d at 1571.
i1" Id. at 1561.

2o0 48 F.2d 1035 (2d Cir. 1931).
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gress did not intend the statute to be limited solely to the factual
situation present in that case. 20 1 According to the Vivitar court, "no
limitations based on indications of Congressional intent at the time
20 2
of enactment can be read into the statute itself."
The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals also rejected the holding
of the Court of International Trade that current Customs Service
regulations reflect a long-standing administrative interpretation of
section 526. The court, after reviewing the regulations promulgated
under section 526 since 1923, and Customs Service administrative
practice over the past fifty years, concluded that "Customs has had
and continues to have a changing view of the role of Customs in enforcing § 526(a) ... ,"203 The court illustrated this changing view by
citing the various instances in which the Customs Service expanded
and then contracted the scope of protection given by the statute. In
particular reference to the Customs Service enforcement of the section, the court stated:
With respect to actual administration practice, during some
years Customs acted to exclude goods which, under its regulations,
should not have been excluded because it lacked information to implement its regulations. Thus, trademark recordants prior to 1953
were treated differently from recordants from between 1953-1959
and those after 1959 differently from those before that date.
Whether earlier recordants are
not treated the same today as those
204
after 1972, we do not know.

The court of appeals also cited the study by the Customs Service and
Treasury Department which has as its ultimate goal the formulation
of a coherent administration policy on grey market imports, a reflection, in the court's view, of the continued uncertainty within the Executive Branch as to the meaning of section 526. Finally, the court
noted that the Customs Service had, in its 1983 amicus curiae brief in
the Mamiya case, urged the court of appeals to construe section
526(a) in accordance with its plain meaning. 20 5
The court of appeals rejected the finding by the Court of International Trade that Congress, by its 1978 amendment of section 526
to include a "personal use" exception, had implicitly ratified the
Customs Service practice under section 526. The court noted that
nothing in the legislative materials indicated that Congress had focused on the Customs regulations then in effect, stating that "legislation by total silence is too tenuous a theory to merit extended
discussion."206
Finally, the court of appeals addressed Vivitar's contention that
201 761 F.2d at 1565.
202 Id.
20: Id.
2'4 id. at 1567.
205 Id. at 1568.
206 Id.
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the current U.S. Customs Service regulations are contrary to the
20 7
clear and unambiguous language contained in section 526(a).
The court stated that Vivitar's claim was based on an erroneous understanding of the structure of section 526 and of the nature of Customs Service regulations. It explained that Vivitar incorrectly
assumed that the regulations in question set limits on the right to
exclude merchandise under section 526208 when actually they do no
more than define the Customs Service's role in initiating administrative enforcement of the statute. Viewed from this perspective, "it is
apparent that the regulations are not contrary to the statute in the
sense that the goods are being routinely excluded which should be
admitted, or vice versa . .

.

. Vivitar's complaint is simply that the

regulations do not go far enough in automatically excluding all types
209
of gray market importations."
The court held that the Customs Service is not required to exclude all grey market goods sua sponte. 2 10 It noted that Congress
could not have foreseen all possibilities in international trade relationships when it enacted section 526. Thus, although the court rejected the argument of the Government that section 526 must be
interpreted as limited by the Customs Service regulations, it concluded that it must also reject the view set forth by Vivitar that section 526 may not have any implied limitation. 21' The court stated
that if it is unclear whether protection under section 526 is warranted, or if entitlement to protection depends on resolution of complex factual situations, the Customs Service may decline to impose,
sua sponte, the extreme sanction of exclusion. It may leave such
cases for initial determination by the federal district court tunder the
private remedies provided to the trademark owner in section
526(c). 2 12 The court observed that because the trademark owner is
provided with injunctive relief and damage remedies against private
parties who infringe U.S. trademarks, agency-initiated action is not
to be expected in all cases. 2 13 The court also noted that the absence
of a provision for expeditious relief and monetary compensation for
207
208
209
210

Id. at 1568-70.
Id. at 1569.
Id.
Id.

211 Id. at 1570.
212 Id.

213 Id. The court of appeals suggested that the availability of private remedies under
19 U.S.C. § 1526(c) implied an intent that some goods seemingly covered by § 526 will be
permitted to enter the United States. Id. Section 526(c) gives a private party the right to
an injunction and damages against parties dealing "in any such merchandise." (emphasis
added). 15 U.S.C. § 1526(c) (1982). The term "such" refers to merchandise whose importation is made unlawful by subsection (a) of § 526 and subject to mandatory seizure
and forfeiture by subsection (b) of § 526. Subsection (c) merely provides trademark owners with a private remedy (injunctive relief and/or damages) against grey market importers
should "such merchandise" evade Customs Service detection and enter the United States.
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an importer whose goods may have been improperly excluded by the
Customs Service strongly supports no automatic administrative exclusion in such cases. It compared this to the Customs Service regulations for copyrighted goods which require the U.S. copyright
owner to post a bond subject to forfeiture for improper Customs
2 14
detention.
In concluding, the court of appeals held that the current Customs Service regulations promulgated pursuant to section 526 are
valid, but not controlling, with respect to the scope of protection afforded by section 526(a). 2 15 The court stated that to obtain any additional protection Vivitar must first seek a federal district court
determination of its alleged rights against parties engaged in the parallel importation of Vivitar grey market merchandise. If successful,
Vivitar would be entitled to have such merchandise excluded by the
2 16
U.S. Customs Service.
The court of appeals' validation of the Customs Service regulations on grounds never before articulated by the Customs Service
ran contrary to one of the fundamental tenets of administrative law,
i.e., that a-reviewing court is to judge the propriety of administrative
action solely on the grounds invoked by the agency. 2 17 This issue, as
well as the substance of the court of appeals' decision upholding the
Customs Service regulations, formed the basis of Vivitar's petition
218
for a writ of certiorari, which was ultimately denied.
b.

COPIAT and Olympus

COPIAT 2 19 and Olympus 22 0 were filed soon after Vivitar and
sought identical relief.2 2 1 Both, however, filed in federal district
court rather than in the Court of International Trade. 22 2 In addi214 761 F.2d at 1570 n.27.
215 Id. at 1570.

216 Id. The court left unanswered the question of whether Vivitar, if successful in a
district court action, would be entitled to have all unauthorized importations excluded by
the Customs Service or only goods imported by the defendants named therein. Vivitar
filed a petition for rehearing and clarification (June 5, 1985), but the petition was denied
by an order dated June 12, 1985.
2 7 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.

Co., 463 U.S. 29, 51 (1983); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947).
218 106 S. Ct. 791.

219 COPIAT, 598 F. Supp. at 844.
22) Olympus, 627 F. Supp. at 911.
221 Vivitar initiated its action by seeking an order of mandamus directing the Customs
Service to prohibit the unauthorized importation of genuine goods bearing the "Vivitar"
trademark, but later amended this request to seek declaratory relief. 593 F. Supp. at 422
n. 1. COPIAT sought declaratory relief in the nature of a declaration from the court that

the Customs Service regulations were inconsistent with both § 526 of the Tariff Act of
1930 and § 42 in accordance with their express terms. 598 F. Supp. at 846. Olympus also
sought both declaratory and injunctive relief against the enforcement of § 133.21 (c) of the
Customs Service regulations. 627 F. Supp. at 911.
222 Vivitar had sued in the Court of International Trade.
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tion, while Vivitar ultimately chose to pursue its claim solely under
section 526 of the Tariff Act of 1930,223 COPIAT and Olympus proceeded with alternative claims under section 42 of the Lanham
22 4
Act.
In COPIAT the district court found that Customs regulations
promulgated under section 526 were consistent with both the Service's prior interpretations of that section and congressional intent. 2 25 The court said that this finding "is amply demonstrated" by
the statute's legislative history and judicial interpretation. 2 26 In addition, the court found "a pattern of legislative acquiescence"
demonstrated by Congress' failure to change subsection (a) when it
amended section 526.227 The court concluded that the Customs Service's construction of section 526 was "sufficiently reasonable, ...
clearly implement[ing] the limited purpose for which section 526 was
enacted and [is] consistent with and effectuate[s] the intent of Congress to permit entry of trademarked goods not involving the Katzel
2 28
situation."
The Olympus district court, relying on a similar interpretation of
section 526,229 concluded that Congress enacted the section for the
limited purpose of responding to the court of appeals decision in
Katzel. Moreover, the court found that Olympus' argument for a
broad interpretation "of section 526 contradicted administrative
practice, legislative history, judicial interpretation, and legislative acquiescence. ' 23 0 The court cited the thorough analyses in Vivitar and
23
COPIAT and saw no need to reiterate them. '
Both the COPIAT and Olympus district court decisions were appealed, and while the Second Circuit has to date not issued an opinion in Olympus, the District of Columbia Court has spoken in the
COPIAT case. 2 3 2 The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
223 585 F. Supp. at 1421 n.l.

224 Both the COPIAT and Olympus trial courts dismissed the § 42 claims for failing t6
state a claim upon which relief should be granted, given that the "copy or simulate" language in that provision limited its application to counterfeit goods, absent the Katzel fact
situation. COPIAT, 598 F. Supp. at 848; Olympus, 627 F. Supp. at 911. The appellate court

in COPIAT did not address the issue inasmuch as it found the Customs Service regulation
contrary to § 526. COPIAT, 790 F.2d at 903.
225 598 F. Supp. at 851.
226 Id.
227 598 F. Supp. at 851. In 1978 Congress amended § 526 to include subsections (d)
and (e). Customs Procedural Reform and Simplification Act, Pub. L. No. 95-410, 92 Stat.
888, 903 (1978) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 1526(d)-(e) (1982)).
228 598 F. Supp. at 852.

229 See 627 F. Supp. at 918.
230 Id.
231 Id. The court also noted that while the Federal Circuit's opinion in Vivitar was
"thorough and thoughtful," it found the court of appeals conclusions as to the scope of
§ 526 to be "less persuasive" than those reached by the Court of International Trade in
Vivitar and the district court in COPIAT. Id.
232 COPIAT, 790 F.2d at 903.
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Circuit reversed the district court in a ruling which conflicted directly
with the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit's decision in Vivitar,233 and held that the Customs Service regulations "simply cannot

be squared with [the language of] section 526" and were thus invalid. 2 34 Alternatively, the court held that the Customs Service regula-

tions were invalid "because they do not constitute a reasonable
interpretation of section 526."235

The court of appeals in COPIA T addressed an issue which the
court of appeals in Vivitar, and many other courts construing section
526, chose to ignore, i.e., that the regulations themselves cannot be
reconciled with the plain language of the statute. 236 In holding the
Customs Service regulations to be contrary to the plain language of
the statute, the COPIAT court rejected the contention of the grey
marketeers, and the finding of the district court, that the regulations
were a reasonable interpretation of the statute by the agency charged
with its enforcement, noting that this doctrine comes into play only
2 37
when Congress has not addressed the precise question or issue.
In the case of section 526, the court held that Congress' intent was
"clear," and that "that is the end of the matter. ' 238
Alternatively, the COPIA T court found, as did the court of appeals in Vivitar, that the legislative history of Section 526 neither indicated a congressional intent contrary to the statutory language
enacted by Congress, 2 39 nor reflected a consistent administrative
practice over a period of time. 240 Further, the court said it could not
find a pattern of legislative acquiescence to the administrative con24
struction of the statute. '
With respect to the legislative intent behind the enactment of
section 526, the court of appeals found that although the floor debate over the proposed legislation did not unequivocally resolve all
questions concerning its scope, it believed that the fear expressed by
Senator Lenroot during the debate, i.e., that the statute meant exactly what it said,2 4 2 was correct. 2 43 The court noted that Senator
Lenroot raised the issue of the treatment of a U.S. subsidiary of a
233 761 F.2d at 1552.
234 COPIAT, 790 F.2d at 905-06.
235 Id. at 908. The court of appeals in COPIATalso rejected the appeals court finding
in Vivitar that exclusive jurisdiction under § 526(a) lay with the Court of International
Trade, and found the U.S. district courts to have jurisdiction to hear such cases. Id. at 90507.
236 Id. at 907-08.

237 Id.
238 Id. at 908. The court of appeals also rejected the notion that the "plain meaning"

rule of statutory construction had been totally discredited.
239 Id. at 910-13.
240 Id. at 913-16.
241 Id. at 917-18.
242 62 CONG. REC. 11,605 (1922).
243 COPIAT, 790 F.2d at 912.
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foreign country, and noted that the bill was never modified to reflect
these concerns. The court of appeals concluded that the reasonable
inference from this was that the lawmakers "did not adopt distinctions among categories of American companies. '24 4 The court of
appeals also cited the legislative history surrounding the reenact24 5
ment of section 526 as confirming this construction of the statute.
The court also cited the Second Circuit's decision in Sturges v. Clark
D. Pease, Inc. 246 to support its conclusion that section 526 implied no
exceptions, particularly noting 2 4 7 Judge Hand's comment that
although section 526 was enacted in response to the Katzel case, "this
fact does not settle the scope of the act."'24 8 Further, the court observed that the contemporaneous administrative constructions of
section 526 by the Customs Service in 1923 and 1931 are "no hint
. .. that it discerned implied limitations on the scope of Section
526."249
The court of appeals concluded that the language of section
526, its legislative history and purpose, and the contemporaneous
construction placed on it precluded the limited construction of the
statute contained in the Customs Service regulations. 2 50 According
to the court of appeals, "[w]hat the statute meant in 1922 and in
1930 is what it means today." 25 1 With respect to the subsequent administrative construction and enforcement of section 526 and the
legislative efforts to amend the statute, the court of appeals, after a
decade-by-decade analysis, 252 concluded that the Customs Service's
construction of section 526 "does not display the necessary 'thor25 3
oughness, validity and consistency' to meet judicial acceptance."
Finally, the COPIAT court, like the Vivitar court, rejected allegations
that any pattern of legislative acquiescence existed with respect to
the administrative construction of section 526.254

Thus, with respect to the three justifications set forth by the
Customs Service to support its construction of section 526, the
courts of appeal in both COPIA T and Vivitar were in total agreement
that such justifications were insufficient to support the current Cus244 Id.
245 Id. at 912-13.

246 48 F.2d at 1035.
247 COPIAT, 790 F.2d at 913.
'248 Sturges, 48 F.2d at 1035.
249 COPIAT, 790 F.2d at 913.
250 Id. at 913-14. Accord ivitar, 761 F.2d at 1565 ("We conclude that no limitations,
based on indications of Congressional intent at the time of enactment, can be read into the
statute itself.").
251 COPIAT, 790 F.2d at 913.
252 Id. at 913-16.

253 Id. at 916. Accord Vivitar, 761 F.2d at 1565 ("Our review.., indicates that Customs
has had and continues to have changing views of the role of Customs in enforcing § 1526(a)"
and does not "afford a basis for definitive statutory interpretation.").
254 COPIAT, 790 F.2d at 917. Accord Vivitar, 761 F.2d at 1568.
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toms Service regulations in light of the statutory language. However, while the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit was willing
to provide its own justification for these regulations, i.e., that they
represented "a reasonable exercise of administratively initiated enforcement," 255 the COPIAT appellate court refused to take such a
step 2 56 on the grounds that the Customs Service had never pur2 57
ported to justify its regulations on this basis.
Therefore, the court of appeals ordered the decision of the district court in COPIA T reversed, and remanded the case to the district
court with instructions to issue a declaratory judgment that the Customs Service regulations at issue were "contrary to Section 526...
258
and hence unlawful."

3.

Weil Ceramics and Premier Dental Products

Weil Ceramics & Glass, Inc. v. Dash 2 59 and PremierDental Products v.
Darby Dental Supply Co. 2 60 were the two major cases decided between

Vivitar and COPIAT involving U.S. trademark owners seeking injunctive relief against individual grey market importers. 26 1 Although the
courts approached each case differently, both found that plaintiffs
were entitled to the relief they sought under section 526.
a.

Weil Ceramics

Plaintiff, a New York corporation, imports and distributes
Lladro porcelain. In 1966, Lladro, S.A., a Spanish corporation, designated plaintiff Weil as the exclusive U.S. distributor of Lladro porcelain and granted Weil the right to obtain the U.S. trademark for
"Lladro." Weil registered the "Lladro" trademark for porcelain and
ceramic ware with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. Beginning
in 1982, defendants Jalyn and Dash Corporation (of which Dash is
255 Vivitar, 761 F.2d at 1571.
256 COPIAT, 790 F.2d at 917-18.
257 Id. at 918. The court of appeals cited SEC v. Chenery Corp. which stands for the
proposition that an administrative order cannot be upheld except on grounds put forth by
the agency. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947).
258 COPIAT, 790 F.2d at 918.
259 618 F. Supp. 700 (D.C.NJ. 1985).
260 No. 85-1780 (E.D. Pa. July 16, 1985), aft'd, 794 F.2d 850 (3d Cir. 1986).
261 In a third case, El Greco Leather Prods. Co., Inc. v. Shoe World Inc., 599 F. Supp.
1380 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), decided subsequent to the Court of International Trade's Vivitar
decision, but prior to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit's affirmation thereof,
the court held that the plaintiff was not entitled to relief under § 526. Plaintiff, a U.S.
trademark owner, complained of grey market imports of shoes bearing the "CANDIE'S"
trademark. The court rejected the broad construction of § 526 adopted in the Mamiya and
Osawa decisions, and chose, instead, to follow the Court of International Trade's thorough
analysis of § 526 and its legislative history in Vivitar. Id. at 1398-1401. Finding the plaintiff therein had not obtained its trademark rights from a foreign trademark owner and was,
in fact, the sole source of the trademarked goods in question, i.e., was not in the position of
A. Bourjois & Co., the court stated that Vivitar made it "clear that the statute [§ 526] is
inapplicable in this case." Id. at 1401.
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285

the president) began importing, distributing, and selling porcelain
products bearing the "Lladro" trademark in the United States without Weil's authorization. Defendants imported genuine Lladro merchandise apparently acquired from authorized foreign retailers and
distributors of its products.
Weil filed a three-count complaint on June 1, 1984, alleging that
defendants violated Weil's exclusive right to the Lladro mark under
section 33(b) of the Lanham Act,2 6 2 that defendants' conduct in-

fringed on Weil's trademark rights in violation of section 32(l)(a) of
the Lanham Act, 263 and that defendants violated Weil's exclusive

right to import products bearing the Lladro trademark under section
42 of the Lanham Act 264 and section 526 of the Tariff Act of

1930.265

Both parties filed motions for summary judgment. The court
granted defendants' motion for summary judgment on the first
count, 2 66 granted plaintiff's motion for summary judgment with respect to liability on plaintiff's second count, and said it would grant
plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on the third count if plaintiff could demonstrate that it had recorded its trademark with the
U.S. Customs Service. Determination of the appropriate relief to be
granted under the Lanham Act and the Customs laws would be de26 7
cided in subsequent proceedings.
The court determined that unauthorized Lladro imports violated sections 32(1)(a) and 42 of the Lanham Act. Thus, pursuant to
section 526, Weil was entitled to exclude unauthorized Lladro imports. 268 A discussion of the court's decision with respect to the
Lanham Act counts is essential to an understanding of the current
status of section 526.
Section 32(1)(a) of the Lanham Act provides that "any person
who shall, without consent of the registrant 'trademark owner,' use
in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a registered mark in connection with the sale ... or distribution . . . of any goods or services . . . which is likely to cause

confusion... or to deceive will be liable for trademark infringement
in a civil action."' 26 9 The Weil court acknowledged that plaintiff
owned the U.S. trademark for "Lladro," and that defendant used the
mark in domestic commerce without its consent. 270 The question
that remained was whether defendant's importation of the Lladro
262 15 U.S.C. § l1 15(b) (1982).
263 Id. § 1114(a).

264 Id. § 1124.
265 19 U.S.C. § 1526 (1982).
266 618 F. Supp. at 704. The court held that § 33(b) of the Lanham Act did not establish a private cause of action. Id.
267 Id. at 714, 718.
268 Id.at 718.
269 15 U.S.C. § 1114(a) (1982).
270 618 F. Supp. at 704.
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porcelain was likely to cause "confusion." The court held that under
the territoriality principal an importer may be an assignee of U.S.
trademark rights in foreign manufactured products bearing the mark
so long as a valid assignment has been made. 2 7' The court noted
that following such an assignment, the importation and sale of genuine goods by anyone other than the domestic mark holder would
cause confusion about the goods' source and thus would infringe on
272
the domestic holder's trademark.
Next, the court examined the language and legislative history of
section 32 of the Lanham Act. According to the court, Congress intended the provision to stem the flow of unauthorized products
thereby ensuring the authorized goods' quality and alleviating confusion about who was ultimately responsible for them. 2 7 3 The court

then examined the "exhaustion doctrine" of trademark law in relation to plaintiff's claim. 2 74 When applied within a sovereign country,
this doctrine prevents a mark holder from controlling trademarked
goods once the goods are released into the stream of commerce. After the first sale, the trademark holder's control is deemed exhausted, and retailers may display and advertise the trademarked
goods. The court noted, however, that in the context of international trade, the doctrine suggested that once the original mark
owner lost control of the trademarked goods, his assignee in a foreign country could not own rights superior to those of the assigned
warrant. The right of control, therefore, seems exhausted. Defendants argued that because Lladro, S.A. exhausted the mark rights by
releasing the goods into the stream of commerce, its assignee, Weil,
could not have rights superior to Lladro, S.A. Thus, Lladro's rights
275
also would be exhausted.
The court rejected this argument. 2 76 After reviewing the few
cases which have addressed the applicability of the exhaustion doctrine to domestic holders related to the foreign holder, the Weil court
refused to apply it when the domestic mark holder had developed a
"separate, factually distinct goodwill" for the product.2

77

The court

found no anomaly in marks on identical products which represented
separate and independent goodwill in different countries. The court
did not mean to imply that a mark's goodwill was better or worse in
any one country but only that the goodwill was different. Whether
separate and distinct goodwill exists depends upon who stands behind the product to ensure its quality. If it is a foreign manufacturer,
271 Id. at
272 Id. at
273 Id. at
274 Id.
275 Id. at
276 Id. at
277 Id.

705.
705-06.
706.
707.

710.
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then distinct goodwill does not exist. If it is a domestic mark holder,
then distinct goodwill does exist. Thus, the court held that a plaintiff
must show a product's "separate, factually distinct
goodwill" before
27 8
an action for infringement may be maintained.
Next the court stated that the existence of separate and factually
distinct goodwill was a question of fact. 2 79 Weil rejected the notion

that mere common ownership or the relation between two companies precludes such a finding. The court reasoned that the question
was whether the U.S. mark holder separately promoted and developed a product's domestic goodwill, or whether the trademark
merely represented a foreign outpost of the original foreign owner's
28 0
goodwill.
The court found that plaintiff sufficiently showed separate and
distinct goodwill for the Lladro porcelain. 28 1 Plaintiff demonstrated
that it guaranteed and ensured the quality of the trademarked goods
sold in the United States by offering to replace all defective pieces.
Retailers who purchased Lladro porcelain from plaintiff knew that
plaintiff backed the goods. Further, plaintiff advertised in national
28 2
magazines as the exclusive importer of the Lladro porcelain.
The court concluded that Weil owned the U.S. trademark for
Lladro porcelain, that defendants had used the mark in domestic
commerce without Weil's consent, and that such use was likely to
cause confusion.2 8 3 Therefore, the court granted Weil's motion for
summary judgment with respect to its claim under section 32(1)(a) of
28 4
the Lanham Act.

Section 42 of the Lanham Act and section 526 of the Tariff Act
of 1930 address the unauthorized importation of trademarked merchandise into the United States. The Weil court stated that if section
32(l)(a) prohibited using products that bore the "Lladro" trademark, then the importation of such merchandise should also be prohibited. The history and purpose of both of these statutes confirm
this interpretation.

28 5

Weil noted that Vivitar changed Customs law, not trademark
law. 2 86 The court concurred with the district court in COPIAT to the

extent that it permitted a truly independent domestic trademark
holder to maintain an infringement action under section 42. The
court stated, however, that if the district court in COPIAT intended
278
279
280
281
282
283
284
285
286

Id. at 711.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 713.

Id.
Id. at 714.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 715.
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"independent" to mean "unrelated," Weil did not agree. 2 8 7 The
court emphasized that a domestic mark holder's status (independent
or affiliate) does not depend on its relation to a foreign entity, but on
the existence of a distinct domestic goodwill for the product. The
court observed that current Customs Service regulations relating to
section 42 and section 526 address ownership and control of related
companies. Although Weil and Lladro, S.A. were not in a parentsubsidiary relationship, they were under common control. Thus,
under Customs regulations, genuine Lladro goods would not be excluded under either section 42 or section 526.288
The court then addressed whether the Customs Service regulations precluded relief under either section 42 or section 526.289 Citing the court of appeals' decision in Vivitar, the court stated that the
regulations do not define the statutory limits of protection. These
regulations only define Customs' role in initiating administrative enforcement of the statute.
Again relying on Vivitar, the court stated that the district court
had discretion to prohibit the importation of a particular grey market
good. In Weil, although the Customs Service did not automatically
exclude the defendant's imported goods, such goods caused confusion within the meaning of section 42. Therefore, the goods could
be excluded pursuant to section 526.290 By ensuring the quality of
the product, Weil developed an independent goodwill in the product. Based on this goodwill, the court concluded that the defend291
ant's importation of genuine goods would also cause confusion.
The court refused to grant summary judgment for plaintiff's
claims under section 42 and section 526 because the court was not
certain that Weil had recorded its trademark with the U.S. Customs
Service. Section 526 requires that the trademark be recorded before
its protections may be invoked. The court stated that if plaintiff later
demonstrated compliance with these prerequisites of section 526,
29 2
summary judgment would be granted for both plaintiff's claims.
b. Premier Dental Products
The plaintiff in Premier Dental Products2 93 is one of the oldest es-

tablished manufacturers and distributors of dental instruments,
materials, and devices in the United States. "IMPREGUM," manufactured by a West German concern, is a patented denture impres287 Id.

at 716.

288

Id. at 717.

289
290
291
292

Id.
Id. at 718.
Id.

Id.
293 Premier Dental Prods. Co. v. Darby Dental Supply Co., No. 85-1780 (E.D. Pa. July
16, 1985), aft'd, 794 F.2d 850 (3d Cir. 1986).
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sion material. In 1968, the West German manufacturer registered

the IMPREGUM trademark with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. In 1974, the West German manufacturer granted plaintiff the
exclusive right to develop, market, and distribute IMPREGUM in the
United States.
Since at least 1984, Premier's name has appeared on all cartons
in which IMPREGUM was sold in the United States. Also in 1984,
the West German manufacturer executed an assignment of all U.S.
rights in the IMPREGUM trademark and U.S. registration of the
the IMtrademark to Premier. Plaintiff subsequently recorded
29 4
PREGUM trademark with the U.S. Customs Service.
Beginning in 1980, defendants purchased IMPREGUM from
Premier and distributed it to dentists and other ultimate consumers. 29 5 In 1983, defendants began purchasing IMPREGUM in Europe to import and distribute in the United States. Except for its
packaging, the IMPREGUM purchased in Europe by defendants was
identical to that sold in the United States by Premier. 29 6 Premier
brought this action to enjoin defendants from further importing IMPREGUM into the United States.
In preliminarily enjoining defendants from such activity, 2 97 the
district court flatly rejected defendant's contention that the "exhaustion" doctrine rendered section 526 inapplicable. 298 Defendants argued that because the West German manufacturer could not prevent
Premier from using the IMPREGUM trademark, the right could not
be assigned to Premier. The court held that-the exhaustion doctrine
was inapplicable to international trade when the foreign assignee developed a separate and independent goodwill. 299 The court found
that plaintiff had developed a goodwill separate from that of the
West German manufacturer and trademark originator.30 0 Thus, if
the assignment of the mark to plaintiff was valid, Premier could "prevent the importation of goods bearing that mark by other parties." '30 Finding the assignment valid in this instance, the court
294 Id., slip op. at 4-9.
295 Id., slip op. at 10. Premier did not sell directly to dentists and other consumers,
but to other distributors.
296 Id., slip op. at 11.

297 Id., slip op. at 2.
298 Id., slip op. at 14. Under the exhaustion doctrine, a seller of trademarked goods
cannot, in the absence of contractual restrictions, prevent or prohibit a buyer from displaying, advertising or marketing the trademarked goods in a nondeceptive manner. Id.
299 Id., citing Osawa & Co. v. B & H Photo, 589 F. Supp. 1163 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); A.
Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel, 260 U.S. 689 (1923).
300 Premier Dental, slip op. at 15.

Plaintiff had provided seminars and instructions to

those wishing to learn about the product, and provided a toll-free telephone number for
users with questions. The court also found that plaintiff was identified in the trade as the
source through which IMPREGUM is obtained. Id.
301 Id. The court did not specifically state that this right lay under § 526, but this inference can be made from the fact that in the previous paragraph (par. 5), the court was
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concluded that plaintiffs made a sufficient showing of likelihood of
success on the merits. 30 2 The court enjoined the named defendants,
for the pendency of the action, from importing IMPREGUM into the
United States because such importations infringed plaintiff's federal
Act of 1930 and
trademark rights under section 526 of the 30Tariff
3
sections 32, 42, and 43 of the Lanham Act.

IV.

Conclusion

The scope of protection afforded by section 526 to U.S. trademark holders has varied considerably since the provision's enactment. The statute was once considered drastic because it allowed
U.S. mark holders to exclude all unauthorized trademarked goods,
even when imported in small quantities for concededly personal
use. 30 4 Later, to exclude unauthorized importation of marked
goods, courts construed section 526 to protect only a very small
group of U.S. trademark owners, those who purchased the mark
rights from an unrelated overseas manufacturer of the goods.3 0 5 Up
until the time of the decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia in COPIAT,30 6 the trend clearly favored a restrictive reading of section 526. With the COPIA T appellate decision
in direct conflict with the Vivitar appellate decision, 30 7 the stance to
be taken by other circuits is unpredictable.
In Vivitar the appellate court held that while Customs' relaxed
enforcement of the statute was not improper, section 526 nevertheless provided relief to U.S. mark holders. 30 8 The mark holder, however, was first required to obtain a district court finding of
infringement before the Customs Service would exclude grey market
merchandise. The court of appeals in Vivitar left unanswered more
questions than it answered. It remains unclear what procedures Customs would use to translate a finding into action. 30 9 More fundamentally, it left unclear whether a district court's finding of
infringement could serve as a basis for Customs to exclude tradediscussing § 526, and did not mention any other statutory provision under which such a
right would arise. Id. at 13.
:102 Id. at 18. The court also found plaintiff had made a sufficient showing of irreparable harm, the relief would not substantially harm the other parties, and the public interest
did not prevent issuance of an injunction. Id.
303 Id. at 2-3. The court also ordered plaintiff to post an injunction bond in the
amount of $50,000 for payment of costs and damages should it be found that defendants
were wrongfully enjoined, Id. at 3.
3o4 See Sturges, 48 F.2d at 1035.

'305 See Vivitar, 761 F.2d at 1552; Guerlain, 155 F. Supp. at 77.
.o(
307
308
30)

COPIAT, 790 F.2d at 903.

761 F.2d 152 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
Id.

There is no procedure currently in the Customs Service regulations which would
be available to U.S. trademark owners who obtained a district court finding of infringement to have the Customs Service exclude merchandise bearing their trademark.
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marked merchandise by all importers or merely those named as defendants in the district court action. There is little basis for
concluding that a district court infringement proceeding, which is in
personam would be applied in rem by the Customs Service. If the
Customs Service will exclude only the goods imported by defendants
named in court action, the mark owner has no reason to go to the
Customs Service at all since injunctive relief would provide the same
protection.
Although the decision of the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit in COPIA T directly conflicts with the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit's conclusion in Vivitar with respect to
the validity of the Customs Service regulations, the two decisions
themselves are remarkably similar. Both courts agreed that the rationales set forth by the Customs Service to justify its regulations were
inadequate for the same reasons. The only difference between the
two cases was that in Vivitar the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit elected to uphold the regulations on grounds never before
espoused by the Customs Service, while the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia in COPIAT refused to do any more than to review the grounds put forth by the agency itself to support its regulations. Of these two approaches, the one taken by the COPIAT court
310
is clearly the more legally sound.
Only the Supreme Court or Congress can now define the correct
construction of section 526. Congress has declined to address such a
highly charged issue. The Supreme Court, although once declining
to review this issue, 3 '' may now do so given the conflict between the
circuits. A definite construction of section 526 by the Court would
be in the best interests of U.S. trademark owners, grey marketeers,
the Customs Service, and the federal judiciary.

310 See Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass'n of the United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 51 (1983); Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum
Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 631 n.31 (1980); See SEC, 318 U.S. at 95. See also American Fed'n of
Gov't Employees Local 1968 v. Federal Labor Relations Auth., 691 F.2d 565, 574 (D.C.
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 926 (1983); Public Media Center v. FCC, 587 F.2d 1322,
1332 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
1lv
tiitar,
106 S. Ct. at 791.

